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INTRODUCTION 
Shortly~  some  200  million or so citizens of the European  Corrmunity  will 
be  going to the polls for  the  second  time  to elect their 434  representatives 
to the European  Parliament1•  Elections will take place on  14  and  17  June~ 
five  years after the first elections by  direct universal  suffrage but once 
again using different electoral  procedures~  since the Member  States have 
been unable  to reach unanimous  agreement  on  a  single method. 
Whatever  the importance of the event might be  for  the functioning and 
development of the European  Community2~  elections to the European  Parliament 
do  provide an  opportunity for a  full-scale  study of public attitudes to the 
Community,  its institutions and the objectives set out in the European 
treaties.  · 
While  the periodical Eurobarometer  surveys have  helped Europeans  to get 
to  know  each  other a  little better~:  the election of a  single parliamentary 
assembly  during a  single week  by  the citizens of the ten countries offers 
an exceptional chance  to gain a  better insight into socio-political pheno-
mena. 
These  were  the considerations which  guided the design and  timing of 
Eurobarometer  No  21~  which is being presented here as a  special editiOn 
just two  weeks  before the  elections. 
We  are also presenting the results of twelve extra questions which  were 
included in the  same  questionnaire and  put to the  same  population sample  as 
a  joint initiative by  the  European  Parliament and  the  Belgian daily Le  Soir4, 
1 Greece  had  not  joined the Community  in 1979;  its members  were  elected in 
October  1981. 
2 The  Treaties  establishing the Community  lay down  Parliament's advisory and 
supervisory power  over Community  legislation  and~  in particular~  the  budget. 
However,  pushed by its own  momentum~  derived from  the  fact  that it is directly 
elected by  the citizens of the  Community~  Parliament  has  assumed  a  sort of 
general political responsibility gradually extending to all fields affecting 
the common  interests of the  peoples of the Member  $tates~  even though it may 
lack the corresponding powers,  In other  u~rds~  Parliament's influence is  · 
far greater than is suggested by  the  formal  description of the areas in 
which it can  take decisions. 
4  . 
See  footnote  1 on  the next page. - II -
Since  the fieldwork was  carried out between mid-March  and mid-April,  very 
little time was  available for analysis of the findings and preparation of the 
report.  Hence  this issue is not divided into its usual chapters,  and  some 
annexes are mi.f]sing.  Some  chapters may  be  published at a  later date and wiU 
be  included in full in Eurobarometer  No  22,  next December. 
*  *  * 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  THE. JUNE  1984  ELECTIONS 
It should be  remembered  that these data  were  gathered before  the election 
campaigns  had  got under way. 
Comparison  of the results with those obtained before the  19?9  elections 
shows  that awareness of the European  Parliament,  as measured  by  the pro-
portion of those who  say  they  have  recently seen or  heard  "something" about 
it, is greater than five  years ago,  an  average of ?5%  in the Community  as 
a  whole  compared with  65%  in April 19?9. 
Strangely  enough,  this increased  au~reness is not accompanied  by  a 
corresponding rise in the percentage of those who  say  spontaneously that the 
"something"  they have  heard was  the election of members  of the European 
Parliament:  in April 19?9  two  thirds  (6?%)  of those who  had  seen or heard 
something mentioned the elections but in March-April  1984  the  figure  had 
fallen to only  39%.  This  suggests that the deep-rooted image  of Parliament 
is .not  sufficiently distinct and  stable and  that people  find it difficult 
to focus  on  the elections in the mass  of information with which  they are 
presented. 
The  image  of Parliament in the public's mind is not,  however,  always 
negative.  Out  of every  ten people  interviewed,  slightly more  than four 
(43%)  consider that Parliament  plays a  "very  important" or  "important" role 
in the life of the Community  while slightly fewer  than four  (38%)  disagree 
and  two  (19%)  don't  know. 
Footnote  fram  page  1 
1 The  following  were  associated with this initiative: 
Belgium:  Le  Soir and  De  Standaard 
Denmark:  BerZingske Tidende 
Germany:  Frankfurter Allgemeine 
France:  Le  Matin 
Ireland:  The  Irish Times 
Italy:  La  Repubblica 
Luxembourg:  Tele-Luxembourg 
Netherlands:  Gemeenschappelijke  Pers Dienst  (G. P. D.) 
United Kingdom:  The  Times 
Greece:  EZeftherotypia - III -
In most  aountries~  attitudes are  less positive than a  year ago,  but in 
some  oases  (Germany,  Franae,  Denmark  and  Belgium)  the position has  improved 
aompared  with five  years before;  in the first aase  this may  be  a  refleation 
of aurrent events and,  in the  seaond,  perhaps,  the gradual  aaquisition of 
legitimciay. 
Although opinions  on  Parliament's present role in the life of the Community 
are divided,  a majority in almost aU aountries would  like to  see it pl-aying 
a  greater part;  the onl-y  exaeption is Denmark,  where  a  further point to note 
is that over  40%  of those questioned either did not  know  or refused to answer. 
Fol-Z-owing·Parl-iament's  vote l-ast  February. for a  draft Treaty  establ-ishing 
a  European  Union  to extend and  strengthen the.powers of the Community,  a 
question phrased in publia opinion survey  terms  was  asked on  the  subjeat: 
are  you  for1or against a  European  Government  responsibl-e  to the European 
ParUament? 
On  average,  one  European  in three  has  not yet formed  an  opinion:  the pro-
portion rises to aZmost  40%  in IreZand and  Franae  and  to aZmost  50%  in 
Denmark  and the United  Kingdom. 
Of those expressing a  view,  there is a  majority in favour  in the Community 
as a  whole  (64%  to  1?%),  and in eight aountries out of ten. 
These  resuZts,  both in the Community  as a whole  and  for individual 
aountries,  refZeat  fairZy  aaaurateZy  the aatuaZ  vote in ParZiament  for 
adoption of the draft Treaty  (?6%  t'o  10%),  In  some  aountries  (BeZgium, 
ItaZy,  Luxembourg,  Neth~rZands and  Germany)  Parliamentary representatives 
appear  keener  than the population as a  whole,  whiZe  the opposite is true in 
other aountries  (Franae  and  Greeae),  where ·the general pubUa  seems  more 
aommitted than the representatives. 
What  wiZZ  be  the  turnout at the June  el-eations?  This is a  diffiauZt 
question to answer and,  mainZy  beaause  of the data  when  it was  aarried out, 
the  survey aan  onZy  give a  general  indiaation of the tendenay.  It wouZd 
seem  Ukely that the  turnout in the Community  as a  whote  in June  1984  wiU 
be  sUghtZy higher than in June  19?9:  64%  against 62%.  Unl-ess  the  Zast  few 
weeks  of the aampaign  provoke  a  surge of interest,  the turnout in the 
United Kingdom  and  Denmark  is tikeZy to remain  Zower  than  eZsewhere,  atthough 
higher than  Zast  time. 
1  "Some  people  say:  "The  members  of the European  Parliament  who  will be 
eZeated in 1984  shouZd,  as a main  aim,  work  towards  a  European  Government 
responsibte to the European  Parl-iament".  Do  you  have  an  opinion on  that 
point,  and  IF  YES  are  you  for  (very muah  or to  some  extent)  or against 
(to  some  extent or very muah)?" -IV-
Questioned about the reasons  for  their attitudes,  those who  said that they 
would vote placed most stress on  the question of principle but there was 
also a  clear feeling  that this was  a  way  of exercising a right as a  European 
citizen.·  Domestic policy considerations certainly played a  part but were 
not usually mentioned as the aruaial  factor.  · 
The  main  reason given by  those intending to abstain was  that they could 
see no  point in voting in a  European  election. 
Other  questions shed a  little more  light on  the motivation of European 
voters and  the factors determining whether or not they will vote. 
If all other things  (nationality,  sex,  age,  level of education,  eta.) are 
equal,  those who  favour  their country's membership of the European  Community 
support European  unification and  would  like to see the role of the European 
Parliament .increased are  the most  likely to vote. 
ATTITUDES  TOWARDS  EUROPE  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
The  general attitude towards  European  unification and  the overall assess-
ment of whether membership of the Community  is a  good  thing are slightly 
less favourabie  than six months  previously,  particularly in Greece.  This 
shift is undoubtedly a  consequence of the  failure of recent European  Councils. 
Similarly,  the percentage of those asked who  feel  that their country  has 
benefited from  Community  membership  has  fallen in the past year in Germany, 
Denmark  and  Belgium,  and  even in Italy and  the  Netherlands. 
But it is perhaps of greater interest to  look at the replies to  some 
questions asked either for the first time  ever or for  the first time in a 
number  of years. 
The  preferred name  for  the Community:  terminology is never neutral a~ it 
is not by  chance  that the terms  "European  Communities",  "European  Eaonomia 
Community",  "Corrrmon  Market",  "the Ten",  and  so  on,  are used to refer to this 
historic and  unprecedented venture of uniting the  peoples of Europe,  the 
European  Community. 
The  survey  showed  that the majority of those expressing an  opinion  (seven 
out of ten)  prefer the name  "European  Community":  40%  on average  compared 
with  1?%  for  "European  Eaonomia  Community"  and  the  same  figure  for  "Common 
Market".  The  British alone prefer  "Common  Market"  (33%)  to  "European 
Community"  (30%). 
The  relationship that aan  be  observed between what  is being described 
and  the  "words  for it" is not just at country  level,  which  would  have 
suggested that the influence was  eaah country's cultural  aharaa~eristias 
and  linguistic praatiaes.  Analysis  shows  that the name  "European  Community" 
is chosen more  often by  those  favourable  to the Community,  whereas  those 
who  are unfavourable tend to prefer the more  restrictive name  "Common  Market". - v-
The  aountry or aountries whiah  people would  prefer not to  have  in the 
Community:  questions have  been asked on  a  number  of oaaasions in the  last 
ten years aonaerning  the opinions and attitudes of Europeans  to one  another 
(aonfidenae,  aloseness,  and  so  on). 
As  far  baak  as  autumn  1976  people  were  asked whether  there were  one  or 
more  aountries,  inaluding their own,  whiah  they would  prefer not to be  in 
the Community. 
In 1984  as in 1976,  a  large majority of respondents would not exalude 
any  aountry,  though  the proportion is smaller:  70%  in 1976  and  59%  in 1984. 
But  what  is new  is that aertain tensions are now  appearing,  undoubtedly 
provoked  by  aurrent aontroversy.  One  person in four,  on  average,  names  the 
United  Kingdom.  This is true of 41%  of the Frenah  and  33%  of the Germans, 
while  25%  of the British feel  the  same  way  about Franae  but only  4%  about 
Germany. 
Two  other questions,  where  replies a!'e  probably  less influenaed by  aur!'erit 
events,  dese!'Ve  a mention. 
One  deals with the  two  a!'eas  in whiah  the aountries of the Community 
working  together should aonaentrate their efforts in the next five or six 
years. 
One  area  stands out alea!'ly:  ·areating jobs,  followed  (at  quite some 
distanae)  by  soaial welfare. 
Slight differenaes aan  be  seen  from  one  country  to another:  in F!'anae 
defenae aomes  seaond,  while in Italy it is agriaulture and in Greece  help 
to the poorer parts of Europe. 
The  other question is a  kind of "referendum"  on  Va!'ious  aspects of 
European  un-jfication - eight altogethe!',  aovering very different areas. 
There  is a  broad European  aonsensus in both  "fors" and  "againsts". 
Eight out of ten,  on  average,  are  in favour of a  kind of EU!'opean  legal 
area  and  the  a!'eation of a  European  passport reaeives a  similar degree of 
support. 
About  six out of ten are in favour of harmonisation of soaial benefits 
and  payments  (although  the majority of Danes  are against);  a  similar 
majo!'ity support  the areation of a  European  aurrenay  (but  again the majority 
of Danes  and  a  substantial minority of the British are against). 
Almost as many  aaaept the pPinaiple that every Community  citizen should 
have  the right to be  employed  in any  of the Member  States;  again  the 
maj o!'i  ty of Danes  are against.  · 
Lastly,  45%  of Eu!'opeans  are stiU opposed to any  form  of proteationism 
against pPoduats  from  othe!' aountries of the Community;  here,  howeve!', 
differenaes  between  aount!'ies are more  marked with the Italians  largely 
favourable  to  the  free movement  of goods  and  the British largely against. - VI  -
Only  two  of the  "proposed decisions" meet with  opposition~  but in both 
cases it is quite definite.  In no  country would the majority of citizens 
accept that only one  ambassador  represent the ten countries of the Community 
in Moscow  or  Washington  or one  European.team  be  sent to the next Olympia 
Games. 
It would  seem  that less importance is attached to the  substance of 
sovereignty  than to some  of its symbols. 
* 
*  * 
An  attempt to  sum  up all these results by  a  multidimensional analysis 
produces  the conclusion  that~  on  average about one  third of those questioned 
form  a  kind of "hard  core" with confirmed,  pro-European  convictions.  They 
will certainly vote  because  they want  the European  Parliament  to play an 
increased role in Community  life, 
At the other  extreme~  a  m-l-nority  of about  15%  on  average  (though more  in 
the United  Kingdom  and  Denmark)  are opposed  to European  unification and  the 
Community.  They  consider Parliament's role to be of litt.le significance 
and  this hardly inspires them  to go  and  vote~ unless  they are die-hard 
opponents  (particularly in Denmark). 
Between  these  two  extremes  lies a  mass  with characteristics that are not 
fairly  easy to always clearaut;  in it can  be  distinguished a  large group 
(about  36%  of the total)  who  are  fairly  favourable  rather than  hostile~ 
though not  actively~  and  another group  (almost  20%)  of people who  are 
indifferent  (or  claim to be). 
All things being  equal~  what  proportion of this potential electorate will 
turn out to vote in countries where  voting is not compulsory will depend 
mainly on  the answers  given to questions as  simple as these: 
- ~~t are the  short-te~ and  long-term objectives proposed for  Europe? 
- What  can  the  European  Parliament do  with its present powers? 
- What  powers  must it claim for  the representatives seeking our votes 
to  be  credible? 
* * * * * * 
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I 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND 
THE  JUNE  1984  ELECTIONS 
Logically,  with  a  view  to measuring  the pattern of replies  and,  specifically, 
the  changes  in public awareness  and  propensity to vote,  the answers  to  the 
questions  on  the European Parliament  and  the  forthcoming  elections  asked  in 
March-April  1984  should  be  compared with  the  findings  of the  previous half-
yearly surveys.  However,  since  these  are  the  second  elections to Parliament 
by direct universal  suffrage,  comparisons  with the results obtained in 
April  1979  are  particularly interesting!, 
One  or other in both  of  these  comparisons will  be  made  depending  on  the 
point under  consideration. 
1 
This  chapter deals with  the  following: 
- awareness  of the  European  Parliament  and  the  election of its members, 
i.e.  whether  or not  the  interviewee has recently heard of either  the 
institution or the  event; 
- image  of the European Parliament,  i.e.  the  importance  of its present 
role  in  the  Community  and  the  role which  the  public would  like to  see 
it play  in future;  in this connection,  a  question was  asked  about 
attitudes  to  the draft  Treaty  on  European  Union  (adopted  by Parliament 
on  14  February 1984)  or,  more  precisely,  about  the  role which 
Parliament  could  play  in working  "towards  a  European Government 
responsible  to  the European Parliament"; 
- propensity to vote  in June,  and  reasons; 
- distinction between national  and  Community  considerations  in the 
voter•s choice  of  candidate  and  expectations  of his  elected represen-
tative. 
Most  of these  questions  had  been asked before. 
See Eurobarometer  No  11,  May  1979. -3-
I.l  AWARENESS  OF  THE  INSTITUTION  AND  THE  ELECTIONS 
"Have  you  reaently seen or heard in the papers,  or 
on  the radio or TV,  anything about  the European 
Parliament?  This is the parliamentary assembly of 
the  EEC  or Common  Market.  If YES,  aan  you  remember 
what it was  that you  heard  then?" 
In  March~April 1984  on  average  seven to eight  in every  ten  interviewed, 
depending on  the  country  concerned or  75%  in the Community  as  a  whole, 
claimed  to have  recently seen or heard  something  about  the European Parlia-
ment. 
·This is slightly up  on  the  65%  (excluding Greece)  recorded  in April  19791. 
As  Table  1  shows,  awareness  has  increased  since April  1979  in five 
countries  out  of nine:  this.is particularly marked  in Germany,  the United 
Kingdom  and France.  In the other countries,  there has  been virtually no 
change2,  . 
A certain optimism about  turnout would  therefore appear  justified but we  3  shall  see later that  these  findings  must  be  treated with  considerable caution 
None  the  less,  the  spring 1984  results clearly reveal  substantial progress 
since  the  previous  survey  in October-November  of last year,  when  the  per-
centage of people who  had  seen or heard  something  about  the European 
Parliament was  only 48%4,  the current  75%  means  that it has  risen by over 
half.  There  was  a  similar,  albeit  less marked,  increase between autumn  1978 
and  spring 19795, 
It is difficult to  say whether  the  increased awareness  of Parliament  is a 
direct result of the official  information campaign undertaken at its request 
in March  1984  by  a  group  of advertising agencies. 
1  Greece's  population weighting  in the Community  as  a  whole  (3.4%  of the 
adult  population)  is  too  low  to  invalidate comparisons  between the 
Community  of nine  and  the Community  of  ten.  For  example,  in 1984  the 
Community  average without Greece would  have  been 75.7%  instead of 75.4%. 
2  No  comparison with  1979  can be  made  for  Greece. 
3  See  18.  p. 
4  See  Eurobarometer No  20,  December  1983,  68.  p. 
5  The  corresponding percentages  were  SO%  and  65%,  an  increase of only  30%. -4-
The  information campaign  for  the  1979  elections  took  place  in January-
February,  i.e.  relatively earlier than  the  one  for  the  1984  elections.  This 
makes  it dangerous  to compare  the effects of  the  two  campaigns. 
However,  the  res.ults  do  show  that  the  average  increase  in awareness  of the 
European  Parliament  in 1984  was  slightly lower  (43%)  in the  three countries 
where  the  campaign had  not  yet  begun when  the  survey was  carried  out  than 
elsewhere  (53%).  This  is no  more  than an  indication,  since many  other 
variables  could have  influenced  the  figuresl, 
* 
*  * 
1  These  are set out  in the  table below:  the  period covered  by  the  information 
campaign,  the  type of campaign,  the  timing of the  Eurobarometer  fieldwork 
and  the  changes  in the  percentage of  those  claiming to have  recently seen 
or heard  something about  the  European Parliament. 
Country*  Period  Type  of  Timing  Had  recently seen or heard  some-
covered  campaign  of Euro- thing about  the European Parlia-
by  barometer  ment 
campaign  fieldwork 
October  March/  Increase** 
1983  April 
.1984 
%  %  % 
Belgium  9-31  March  TV  14-30 March  35  74  109 
Germany  5-26 March  Magazines  17  March  - 47  79  70 
9  April 
France  4-31  March  TV  17  March  - so  82  62 
9  April 
United  - - 19  March  - 48  72  51 
Kingdom  1  April 
Italy  5-30 March  TV  19  March  - 48  71  49 
5 April 
Ireland  - - 21  March  - 52  75  46 
6  April 
Nether- 9-30 March Magazines  24-31  March  52  73  41 
lands 
Greece  - - 16-27  March  51  67  31 
Lux em- 4-31  March  Multi- 22  March  - 67  81  21 
bourg  media  13  April 
Denmark  5-29 March  News- 24  March  - 62  74  19 
papers  &  1  April 
magazines 
*  The  countries  are listed in descending order of increase in positive responses. 
**  Increases have  been calculated  from  unrounded  percentages. -5-
As  this table  shows,  with  three months  to  go  to  the  June  1984  elections, 
awareness  of  the European Parliament,  reflected  in the  percentage  of  people 
who  had  seen or heard  something about  it, was  relatively high  in all 
countries.  What  is more,  it was  even higher  than  in April  1979,  two  months 
before  the previous  elections,  and  considerably higher than last autumn, 
What  is the  reason  for  this awareness?  To  what  extent were  the  affirmative 
replies  to  the straight question on the  European Parliament  influenced.by 
the elections? 
Here  one  must  admit  to  a  slight degree  of disenchantment  or at least 
display extreme  caution in using  the data  available to assess  the  likely 
turnout1. 
The  question,  reproduced  above,  was  a  double  one.  Those  interviewed were 
first asked whether  they had  recently seen or heard  somethin~ about  the 
European Parliament  (which  was  mentioned  explicitly).  If they had,  they 
were  then asked,  without  any·  prompting,  if they could  remember  what  it was 
about. 
The  second  test was  much  more  difficult.  Once  again,  we  shall  compare 
the results with  those obtained  in April  1979  and  autumn  1983. 
In March-April  1984,  less  than  four  in ten  (39%)  of  those who  said  that 
they had  recently seen or heard  something  about  the European Parliament 
spontaneously mentioned  the elections. 
This  is a  very  low  percentage,  much  lower  than  the  67%  recorded  in April 
1979,  despite the  fact  that  the  increase over  the  ~receding six-month  period 
was  greater  in 1983-84  than it had  been  in 1978-79  , 
How  can this be  explained? 
As  we  said earlier,  the  second part of the  question  is more  difficult 
than  the  first.  It is not  therefore  surprising that  those  who  can  sponta-
neously mention the election are  outnumbered  by  those who  remember  vaguely 
or  otherwise  that  they have  recently  seen or heard  something  about  the 
European Parliament. 
1  It would  seem logical  that  there  should be  a  strong correlation between 
turnout  and  adequate  information,  and  this is borne  out  by research  on 
the  previous  election.  See  Eurobarometer No  20,  December  1983,  p.  63. 
2  Although,  on  average,  the  increase between  autumn  1983  and  spring 1984  was 
greater  in  the  seven countries where  the  information campaign had  taken 
place during March,  this does  not  necessarily mean  that  the  campaign was 
the decisive  factor.  Italy and  Greece  were at  the  same  level  in October 
1983  and  both recorded the  same  very high  increase.  In the  first,  the 
television campaign had  begun before  the  survey while  in the  second  the 
campaign did not begin until  15  May;  other  influences must  therefore have 
come  into  play. -6-
But  this  logical  explanation was  also true  in 1979,  And  yet,  although  the 
percentage who  claimed  to have  seen or heard  something was  higher  in  1984, 
the  proportion of  those  able to refer  specifically to  the election was  much 
smaller  in all countries.  Obviously,  there must  be  another explanation, 
Awareness  of an  event  (or  an  institution or  a  person),  in other words  the 
fact  that  it is widely known,  is  triggered off by  several  factors,  two  of 
which are particularly important:  the  scale of media  coverage  given  to  the 
event  and  its deep-rooted  image  in the  public's mind, 
There  is no  doubt  that  in recent months  the media  have  paid much  more 
attention to Parliament  than usual.  But  it would  appear  that its basic  image 
was  not  such  as  to allow  the  trickles  of  information which  have  percolated 
through  to  amalgamate  into a  stable  coherent whole. 
Moreover;  in 1979  the elections had  a  certain novelty value whereas  in 
1984  when  the  survey was  carried out  the election had not  emerged  in its own 
right  from  the more  or  less  confused  mass  of  information about  the  European 
Parliament. 
Without  pushing  the  image  too  far,  there are  a  large  number  of individuals 
who  can honestly claim to have heard  or  seen  something  about. the  European 
Parliament  but  are  then  in  the  position of people who  have  heard  a  sound  (or 
at  best  a  piece of music)  which  they are  unable  to place or recognize  the 
significance ofl. 
* 
*  * 
Table  1  shows  the  percentage of  those  interviewed  in April  1979  and  March-
April  1984  who  said: 
1 
1.  that  they had  or had  not  recently seen or heard  something about  the 
European Parliament; 
2.  that  they had  heard  something  and  mentioned  the  elections. 
(See Table  1) 
What  is it which  makes  an  individual mentally construe a  particular event 
as  important?  In other words,  what  makes  it emerge  from  the  flood  of 
stimuli which  he  receives?  One  factor  is  the  relationship which  the 
individual  perceives  between  the event  and  himself:  the  consequences; 
what  is at stake.  Another  is  the  profile of the  event:  the media  coverage 
given to it, but  also the  scale of perceived  public  concern  and  the  extent 
of public discussion which  it provokes. 
In March-April  1984,  elections  to  the European  Parliament  did  not  (or not 
yet)  fill the bill. B 
Table  1 
AWARENESS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  FORTHCOMING  ELECTIONS 
B  I  OK  .I  D  F  ·I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  .. IEcl 
%  I  %  I  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I 
April  1979  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Had  recently  seen or heard  something  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
about  the  European  Parliament  i·  65  I  76  I  60  65  I  73  I  77  I  76  I  76  I  55  I  ;  I  65  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
- spontaneously mentioned  elections  I  (47)  I  (51)  I  (46)  (38)  I  (48)  I  (60)  I  (57)  I  (53)  I  (25)  I  :  I  (43)  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
- did not  spontaneously mention  elections  I  (18)  I  (25)  I  (14)  ( 27)  I  (25)  I  ( 17)  I  ( 19)  I  (23)  I  (30)  I  :  I  (22)  I 
Had  not  seen or heard anything  (don,t  I  35  I  24  I  40  35  I  27  .  I  23  I  24  I  24  I  45  I  :  I  35  I  knows  included) 
I 
total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
Of  every  100  who  had  recently seen  or 
heard  something  about  the  European  :  --.1 
Parliament,  percentage who  mentioned  I  72%  I  68%  I  76%  I  59%  I  66%  I  78%  I  75%  I  70%  I  46%  I  :  I  67%  elections 
March-April  1984  I  I  I  I  I 
Had  recently seen or heard  something  I  I  I  I  I 
about  the European  Parliament  I  74  I  74  I  79  I  82  I  75  I  71  I  81  I  73  I  72  I  67  I  75 
I 
I 
- spontaneously mentioned  elections  i  (40)  I  (36)  I  (38)  I  (39)  I  (27)  I  (29)  I  (21)  I  (24)  I  (10)  I  (24)  I  (29) 
I 
- did not  spontaneously mention  elections  I  ( 34)  I  ( 38)  I  (41)  I  (43)  I  (48)  I  ( 42)  I  (60)  I  (49)  I  ( 62)  I  (43)  I  ( 46) 
Had  not  seen or heard anything  (don,t  I  26  I  26  I  21  I  18  · I  25  I  29  I  19  I  27  I  28  I  33  I  25  knows  included} 
I 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
Of  every  100. who  had  recently  seen 0r 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I.  heard something  about  the  European 
Parliament,  percentage  who  mentioned  I  54%  I  49%  I  48%  I  47%  I  36%  I  41%  I  26%  I  33%  I  14%  I  36%  I  39%  L  __ elections  _. 
Average weighted  by  the  population  aged  15  and  over  in the country in question. -8-
I.2  THE  IMAGE  OF  PARLIAMENT 
Considerable research has  already been done  on this subject,  particularly 
in a  survey carried out  for  Parliament1.  The  updated  and  expanded  results 
are set out  below. 
I.  2.1  The.importance  of Parliament's  present  role 
"How  important,  would  you  say,  is the European 
Parliament in the  life of the European  Community 
nowadays:  very important,  important,  not very 
important,  not at aU important?" 
On  average,  just over  four  people out of every ten  interviewed  in March-
April  1984  considered  that Parliament  played  an "important"  (34%)  or  "very 
important"  (9%)  role  in the life of the European Cmmnunity,  while  slightly 
fewer  than  four  out of  ten disagreed  and  two  out of  ten didn't  know. 
It will be  noted  that  the  intermediate replies  ("important" .and  "not very 
important")  were  by  far  the-most  common;  this  suggests  that  even  those who 
answered  found  it difficult  to  come  down  on one  sid'e or  the other. 
Be  that as  it may,  in eight of the ten Member  States affirmative replies 
predominated;  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  Greece  were  the most  positive.  Nega-
tive views  predominated  slightly in the Netherlands  and,  marginally more, 
in Germany. 
As  Table  2  shows,  in most  countries,  regardless of whether or not  an  in-
formation  campaign had  been mounted,  the proportion of positive replies was 
lower  than a  year earlier. 
However,  measured  over  five years,  the  trend  is  positive  in  four  countries: 
Germany,  France,  Denmark  and  Belgium, 
(See  Table  2) 
1  The  European Parliament  and  the  1984  elections.  This  survey was  published 
as  a  supplement  to  Eurobarometer  No  19,  April  1983. 
2  The  results  for  these  countries  show  a  decline  in the number  of don't knows, 
particularly in Belgium,  This  suggests  that,  as Parliament  becomes  better 
known,  or more  precisely as  its  image  penetrates more  deeply,  its 
importance  in the eyes  of the  public  tends  to  increase. 
Surveys  over  a  much  longer period of time  would  obviously be required  to 




Very  important 
Important 
Not  very  important 
Not  at all  important 
Don't  know 
Total2  Index 
April  1983 
Very  important 
Important 
Not  very  important 
Not  at all important 
Don't  know 
Total2  Index 
March-April  1984 
Very  important 
Important 
Not  very  important 
Not  at all  important 
Don't  know 
Total2  Index 
1  Weighted  average. 
Table  2 
·THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  PARLIAMENT  IN  THE  LIFE  OF  THE  COMMUNITY 
I  B  I  OK  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  EC  1  I 
I  %  I  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  % 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  s  I  6  a  I  s  I  19  I  16  I  11  I  9  I  20  I  :  1  o 
I  2s  I  11  1s  I  28  I  34  I  34  I  46  I  4o  I  3o  I  :  21 
I  22  I  31  41  I  32  I  23  I  19  I  22  I  32  I  23  I  :  29 
I  8  I  5  16  I  to  I  6  I  6  I  1  I  6  I  ·  9  I  :  10 
I  4o  I  41  2s  I  2s  · I  18  I  2s  I  14  I  13  I  18  I  :  24 
I  100  I  100  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  :  100 












I  5 
I  37 
I ·  37 
I  9 
I  12 
I  9 
I  45 
I  22 
I  2 
I  22 
I  24  I  14  I 
I  41  I  45  I 
I  14  I  22  I 
I  3  I  2  I 
I  18  I  17  I 
11  I  7  I  15  I  13  I  11 
51  I  41  I  37  I  43  I  40 
23  I  34  I  27  I  13  I  27 
3  I  .5  I  5  I  2  I  5 
12  I  13  I  16  I  29  I  17 
I 
1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  T.  1oo  -- I 
























































1oo  I .  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo  I  1oo --l  too  I  1oo  --I  1oo  I  1oo  l 
2.59  I  2.58  I  2.42  I  2.61  I  2.78  I  2.65  I  2.74  I  2.48  I  2.52  I  2.67  I  2.ss  I 
2  "Very  important"  =  4,  "not at all  important"  =  1;  don't knows  excluded.  The  mid-point  is  therefore  2.5. 
>.0 -10-
!.2.2  What  role  should Parliament  play? 
"Would  you,  personally,  prefer that the  European 
Parliament  played a  more or less important part 
·than it does  now?" 
This  question has. been  asked  three times  since  spring  1983.  As  Table  3 
shows,  replies have  remained  remarkably  stable and,  in most  countries,  have 
tended  to  favour  an  expansion of Parliament's role.  The  only exception is 
Denmark,  where  two  thirds of those  interviewed did not  reply or  answered 
spontaneously "about  the  same"l,  In the United  Kingdom,  which  had  about 
the  same  percentage of don't  knows  as  the other  countries apart  from  Denmark, 
there was  slightly more  support  (34%)  for  expanding Parliament's role than 
for  reducing it (24%). 
The  main  points worth  noting are firstly that  in the Community  as  a  whole 
and  in nine of the  ten Member  States there is  a  majority in  favour  of extend-
ing Parliament's role,  and  secondly that views  remain very stable,  un-
influenced  in either direction by  the  information campaign. 
(See Table  3) 
1.2.3  For  or against  the  plan for  European political union 
On  14  February 1984,  by  a  large majority,  the European Parliament  adopted 
a  draft Treaty establishing  the European Union,  designed  primarily to  extend 
and  strengthen  the  existing Community  treaties. 
Adoption of  the draft  Treaty was  seen both by  its originators  and  its 
supporters ·as  one  of  the  issues  on which  Community  citizens would  have  to 
work  out  how  they  stood when  the  time  came  to select their representatives 
in the  June  elections. 
The  following  question couched  in public opinion survey  terms  was put  to 
interviewees: 
1 
"Some  people  say:  "The  members  of the European 
Parliament who  will be  elected in 1984  should,  as a 
main  aim,  work  towards  a  European  Government 
responsible to the European  Par Uament ".  Do  you 
have  an  opinion on  that point,  and  IF  YES  are  you 
for  (very much  or to  some  extent)  or against  (to  some 
some  extent or Very  much)?" 
This  option was  not offered  in the  question but was  recorded  and  counted 
by  the  interviewer. .• 
Table  3 
WHAT  ROLE  SHOULD  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  PLAY? 
April  1983  I  B  I  DK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I ECl 
The  role of the  European  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I 
Parliament  should  be: 
- more  important  I  48  I  17  I  49  I  55  I  41  I  71  I  50  I  58  I  34  I  58  I  52 
-about the·same  I  16  I  29  I  17  I  16  I  20  I  10  I  33  .  I  20  I  20  I  6  I  16 
- less  important  I  6  I  16  I  11  I  3  I  10  I  1  I  6  I  8  I  27  I  3  I  10 
Don't  know  I  30  I  38  I  23  I  26  I  29  I  18  I  11  I  14  I  19  I  33  I  22 
I 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
October  1983  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
- more  important  I  50  I  19  I  57  I  60  I  46  I  76  I  58  I  56  I  48  I  70  I  59  I  - - - about  the  same  I  16  I  30  I  12  I  14  I  18  I  7  I  20  I  18  I  17  I  5  I  13 
- less  important  I  12  I  22  I  10  I  5  I  12  I  2  I  9  I  10  I  20  I  4  I  10 
Don't know  I  22  I  29  I  21  I  21  I  24  I  15  I  13  I  16  I  15  I  21  I  18 
I 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
\ 
March-A2ril  1984  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
- more  impor·tant  I  53  I  15  I  44  I  54  I  40  I  67  I  57  I  56  I  34  I  65  I  50 
- about.the  same  I  21  I  26  I  20  I  18  l  22  I  8  I  26  I  21  I  23  I  10  I  17. 
- less  important  I  10  I  19  I  10  I  4  I  11  I  2  I  3  I  8  I  24  I  4  I  10 
Don't  know  I  16  I  40  I  26  I  24  I  27  I  23  I  14  I  15  I  19  I  21  I  23 
I 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
1  Weighted  average. 
2  Volunteered. -12-
The  question begins  by  asking  interviewees whether  they have  an opinion 
on  the  subject.  This  was  a  deliberate device  to  enable don't  knows  to  be 
filtered out ,1 
The  first point of  interest is that  on  average  one  European  in three has 
not  yet  formed  an opinion.  This  is hardly surprising,  as  the  proposal  is 
very recent,  has  been little discussed  outside  the European Parliament  and 
has not  received much  media  attention.  The  proportion of don't knows  is 
as high  as  four  in ten in Ireland  (38%)  and  France  (39%)  and  almost  one  in 
two  in Denmark  (45%)  and  the United  Kingdom  (47%). 
Of  thos·e  who  have. an opinion,  the vast majority  in the Community  as  a 
whole  is  in favour  (64%  as  against  17%);  this holds  good  for  eight of  the 
ten Member  States.  The  exceptions  are  the United  Kingdom,  where  the majority 
is  slim  (46%  as  against  37%)  and  Denmark,  where  there  is only  a  small minority 
in  favour  (23%  as  agairist  63%). 
(See Table 4) 
It is interesting to  compare  these  figures  with the results of voting  in 
the  European Parliament  on  14  February. 
The  draft Treaty was  adopted  by  237  votes  to  31  with 43  abstentions;  311 
members  took part  in the vote,  giving percentages of  76%,  10%  and  14% 
respectively. 
The  corresponding percentages  for  our representative  sample  were  64%,  17% 
and  19%,  showing  that,  overall,  Members  of Parliament  are warmer  in their 
support  for  the  plan than the  public  they represent. 
However,  although there  is a  very  strong correlation between  the  two  sets 
of  figures,  comparison reveals  slight differences  between  the countries.2 
Members  from  three countries  (Belgium,  Italy and  Luxembourg)  who  took  part 
in the vote were  unanimously  in  favour  of  the draft  and  those  f~om two  other 
countries were  almost  unanimous  (Netherlands:  96%;  Germany:  92%).  It is 
hardly surprising that,  in those  five  countries,  the "representatives" were 
much  more  pro  than the "represented". 
1 
2 
A question on  the  same  subject was  asked  in October  1983  but  it had  no 
"filter", was  placed  in a  different context  and  the  range  of  answers 
offered was  more  limited,  (See Eurobarometer No  20,  pp.  71-73).  It 
would  therefore  be  extremely hazardou.s  to make  comparisons  between the 
two  sets of results. 
Correlation between  percentages  showing net  support  for  the draft  ("for"  -
"against")  :  r  = .  91. .. 
Table  4 
'FOR  OR  AGAINST  THE  DRAFT  TREATY  OF  UNION 
-~--------
r  I  B  I  DK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I ECl  I 
I  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %.  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I 
11.  Of  everx;  100 · irtterviewed 
Have  not yet  formed  an opinion  I  24  I  45  I  24  I  39  I  38  I  27  I  21  I  12  I  47  I  33  I  33 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
For  - very much  I  14  I  5  I  15  I  9  I  11  I  16  I  21  I  21  I  7  I  17  I  12 
- to  some  extent  I  31  I  7  I  33  I  31  I  23  I  42  I  34  I  42  I  17  I  24  I  31 
Indifferent  I  25  I  8  I  20  I  10  I  17  I  8  I  12  I  16  I  9  I  17  I  13 
Against  - to  some  ext~nt  I  5  I  7  I  6  I  8  I  7  I  5  I  9  I  6  I  11  I  5  I  7 
- very much  I  1  I  28  I  2  I  3  I  4  I  2  I  3  I  3  I  9  I  4  I  4 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 




I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
For  - very uruch  I  19  I  9  I  19  I  15  I  18  I  22  I  27  I  24  I  13  I  26  I  18 
I 
- to  some  extent  I  41  I  14  I  44  I  52  I  37  I  58  I  42  ·I  48  I  33  I  35  I  46 
Indifferent  I  33  I  14  I  26  I  16  I  28  I  11  I  15  I  19  I  17  I  25  I  19 
Against  - to  some  extent  I  6  I  13  I  8  I  12  I  11  I  6  I  12  I  6  I  21  I  7  I  11 
- very much  I  1  I  50  I  3  I  5  I  6  I  3  I  4  I  '3  I  16  I  7  I  6 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
Index  2  I  3.16  I  1. 79  I  3.07  I  2.90  I  2.91  I  3.11  I  3.08  I  3.13  I  2.51  I  3.07  I  2.94 
1  Weighted  average. 
2  "Very much  for"  = 4,  "very much  against" = 1;  "indifferents" excluded.  The  mid-point  is therefore  2.5. -14-
The  situation in the other countries  is different: 
- in France  and  Germany  the open opposition of  some  of the Members  and  the 
· apparent  imposition of  a  "whip"  by  the  party in power  combined  to reduce 
the  number  of votes  in favour  of  the draft;  the result was  that Parliament's 
vote of  14  February recorded  a  smaller percentage  in  favour  than the  Euro-
barometer  survey; 
- in Ireland and  the United  Kingdom,  on  the  other hand,  the  parliamentary 
representatives  were  warmer  in their support  than the  general .public  when 
surveyed  a  few  weeks  later; 
- in Denmark,  opposition to  the draft  ran at  about  the  same  level  among 
members  of  the European Parliament  and  the public at  large but  the minority 
group  in  favour  among  the "representatives" was  slightly smaller  than 
among  the "represented". 
(See  Table  5) 
Table  5 
THE  DRAFT  TREATY  OF  UNION  AS  VIEWED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  GENERAL  PUBLIC 
European Parliament  Public  opinion  I 
(14  February 1984)1  (March-April  1984)2  I 
For  Against  Absten- For  Against  Absten- I 
tions  tions  I 
I  Belgium  100%  60%  7%  33%  I 
Denmark  14  64  22  23  63  14  I 
Germany  92  8  63  11  26  I  I  France  52  12  36  67  17  16  I  I  Ireland  71  29  55  17  28  I 
Italy  100  80  9  11  I 
Luxembourg  I  100  69  16  15  I  I  Netherlands  I  96  4  72  9  19  I 
United Kingdom!  53  28  19  46  37  17  I 
I Greece  ~  47  11  42  61  14  25  I 
TOTAL  I  76  10  14  64  17  19  I 
I 
1  Percentages  based  number  of  on  Members  who  took  part  in the vote  (311  out 
of 434). 
2  Percentages  based  number  of  interviewees who  claimed  to have  an  opinion.  on -15-
I.3  VOTING  PROPENSITY  AND  REASONS 
On  a  number  of occasions  both before  the  1979  elections  and  again since 
April  1983,  the  following  question was  put  to  those of voting  age: 
"Next  June~  the citizens of countries belonging to 
the European  Community~  including  (yours)  wiU be asked 
to vote to elect members  of the European  Parliament. 
Do  you  think that you  will certainly go  and  vote~ 
probably go  and  vote~  probably will not  vote~  certainly 
wiU not vote?"l 
In  the  run-up  to  the  1984  elections,  two  further  questions  were  asked 
for  the  first  time: 
1 
ALL  WHO  SAY  THEY  WILL  CERTAINLY  VOTE  OR  PROBABLY  VOTE: 
"Here  is a  Ust of statements  (Show  CARD)  explaining 
why  some  people might.go and  vote in the next election 
for  the European  Parliament.  Which  of these  comes  close 
to your  own  reasons  for intending to vote in that 
election? 
(Mark  all mentioned) 
1.  Whatever  the  election~  I  use  my  right to vote as a 
.matter of principle, 
2.  I  feel  I  am  a  citizen of Europe  and it is important 
for me  to vote in an  European  Election. 
3.  It will be  an  opportunity for  me  to show  where  I 
stand in  (national)  politics. 
4.  Other reason, 
ALL  WHO  SAY  THEY  WILL  CERTAINLY  NOT  OR  PROBABLY  NOT 
VOTE  IN  THE  NEXT  ELECTION  FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT: 
"Here  is a  list of reasons why  some  people may  not 
go  and  vote in the next election for the  European 
Parliament  (Show  CARD),  Which  of these  come  close to 
your  own  reasons  for not intending to vote? 
1.  I  hardly ever vote. 
2.  Voting in our own  election· is something  worth  doing~ 
but I  do  not really see any  point in voting in a 
European  Election. 
3.  Not  voting in the  European  Election will be  my 
way  to  show  my  disagreement  with  (my  country's) 
membership of the  European  Community. 
4.  Other reason. 
In  countries  where  voting  is  compulsory  and  failure  to  turn  out  is 
penalized,  the  question was  preceded  by  "Supposing voting were  not 
compulsory  in this  country  ...  " -16-
The  1979  survey  showed  that  the question "Do  you  think that  you will 
vote?" was  an  excellent  indicator although  it should be  remembered  that  in 
the case of Germany  the "probables"  had  to be  added  to  the "certains"  to 
bring  the  figure  close to  the actual  turnout. 
What  then is  the  position now,  with only a  few  weeks  to  go  before  the  1984 
elections? 
The  March-April  survey  suggests  that turnout  generally is likely to be 
slightly higher  than  in April  1979. 
Table  6  contains  the  raw  scores which  nrust  be  examined  and  interpreted 
country  by  country. 
(See  Table  6) 
While  answers  "will cert·ainly go  and  vote"  are consistent with  those 
obtained  in 1979,  now  as  then  some  adjustments  have  to be made.  For  example, 
it goes  without  saying that  in Belgium and  Luxembourg,  where  abstention  is 
normally  penalized,  the  turnout will  be very much  higher  than  shown  by  the 
survey.  Similarly,  in Germany,  it is clear that what  was  true  in 1979  is 
also  true this  time:  the best  indicator of turnout  is obtained by  adding 
the "certains"  and  the  "probables". 
These  corrections  based  on  experience  have  therefore been made  to  revise 
the results to  give  the best  possible indication of turnout  in June  1984. 
They  suggest  a  figure  of  64%,  marginally higher than  the  62%  recorded  in 
June  1979. 
Table  7  shows  the  revised estimates  by  country but it should  be  remembered 
that  they reflect data gathered  in March-April,  before  the election campaign 
as  such  had  started. 
(See  Table  7) 
* 
*  * 
Why  do  people vote or abstain?  In an attempt  to  answer  this,  we  shall 
now  look at  the replies  to  two  further questions,  one  put  to  those who  said 
that  they  would  vote  and  one  to  those who  said  that  they would  abstain.  But 
before going  any  further,  we  must  make  it clear that  a  distinction has  to 
be  made  between  the  reasons  given to  those  interviewed  and  other factors 
of which  they. may  not  be  aware.  What  is of  interest  to  us  here are  the  more 
or less rationalized explanations  advanced  by  those  interviewed  to "justify"  -
in their eyes  or  those of the  interviewer - their decision to vote or  to 
abstain. 1 
1  It is irrelevant.in this particular context  that  some  of  those who  said 
that  they would  "certainly" or "probably" vote  wil~ not  turn out  and 
conversely that  some  of  those  who  said  they would  abstain will  in fact 
vote. 1  .  d  Reg1stere  voters. 
2  Average weighted  by  the  number  of registered voters  in each  country.  Greece  included  in 1984. 
3  Question not  asked. 
4  Source:  Euroeean Parliament:  Research  and Documentation Paeers  No  3,  December  1983. 
5  78,6%  in October  1981. -18-
Table  7 
TURNOUT  PROJECTIONS 
Turnout  in  I Turnout  in  I Turnout  in  I ESTIMATED 
previous  I 1979  European I last national I TURNOUT  IN 
national  I elections  I eiection  I  1984 
election  (%)  I  (%)  I  (%)  I  (%) 
Belgium  93.7%  91.3%  94.5%  90-92%  I 
(17/12/78)  (8/11/81)  I 
I 
Denmark  88.7  46.8  88.4  55  I 
(15/2/77)  (10/1/84)  I 
67 1  I 
Germany  90.7  65.9  89.1  I 
(3/10/76)  (6/3/83)  I 
73 2  I 
France  82.8  60.7  70.4  I 
(12/3/78)  (14/6/81)  I 
I 
Ireland  76.3  63.6  72.8  55  I 
(16/6/77)  (24/11/82)  I 
I 
Italy  89.9  85.5  89.0  76  I 
(3/6/79)  (26/6/83)  I 
I 
Luxembourg  90.1  88.9  88.9  88-90  I 
(26/5/74)  ( 10/6i79)  I 
I 
Netherlands  88.0  57.8  81.0  64  I 
(25/5/77)  (9/9/82)  I 
363  I 
United Kingdom  75.1  32.6  72.7  I 
(3/5/79)  (9/6/83)  I 
78.64  I 
Greece  81  I 
(18/10/81)  I 





In Germany  estimates  by  three  survey  institutes average out at  69%. 
This  estimate  is undoubtedly too high;  actual  turnout will  probably be 
somewhere  between this  figure  and  the  1979  turnout. 
This  estimate  for  the United  Kingdom  may  be  too  low.  A more  recent 
Marplan  survey predicted a  turnout of  SO%,  which  seems  mucP  too high. 
Our  estimate  for  Northern  Ireland  is  52%,  slightly down  on  1979  (57%). 
4  In Greece  the  1981  elections  to the national  and  European Parliaments were 
were held on  the  same  day. 
5  Average  weighted  by  the  number  of registered voters  in each  country. -19-
We  shall look first at  the reasons  advanced  by  intending voters.  The 
two  most  common  are "principle"  ("Whatever  the  election,  I  use  my  right  to 
vote as  a  matter of principle")  which  is  top of the list,  followed  by 
"Europeanism"  ("I feel  I  am  a  citizen of Europe  and  it is  important for  me 
to vote  in a  European election"),  A much  smaller proportion are motivated 
by  the desire  to 'show  where  they stand  in national  politics. 
The  breakdown of these replies  by  country is interesting. 
In nearly all the countries,  it is  the  question if principle which  counts 
the most;  only  in Luxembourg  and,  to  a  lesser extent,  Germany  is  the  feeling 
of  being  a  European citizen the most  common  reason given for voting.  Even 
in France;  Germany, .Greece  and  Luxembourg,  where  the connection between  the 
European elections  and  national  politics was  more  common  than  elsewhere, 
only  25%  to  30%  of  intending voters  opted  for  this  explanation.· 
(See  Table  8) 
Explanations  for  abstention are  probably less reliable for  two  reasons: 
the  first is statistical, as  calculations are based  on  a  smaller  sample  in 
each country;  the  second  is psychological,  as  interviewees are  probably  less 
likely to  give  reasons  for  conduct which  is regarded as  socially undesirable. 
That  said,  the main  reason  given  in almost all countries,  and  in particular 
in Belgium,  Germany,  the United  Kingdom  and  Denmark,  is  failure  to  see  the 
point of a  European  election,  This  is  followed  by "other reason",  not 
spelled out  in this  survey,  which  probably  serves  to  cover up  the  reluctance 
to  give  explanations,  which  we  mentioned  above.  Greece  is a  one-off with 
two  thirds of those who  say that  they  intend to abstain,  claiming  that  they 
hardly  eve~ vote,  The  small  number  of abstentions  in that  country,  where 
voting is  compulsory under certain conditions,  suggests  that it is highly 
likely that  those  concerned will abstain in both  European and  national 
elections,  even if they are held  on  different days• 
(See Table  9) Table 8 
REASONS  FOR  VOTING  GIVEN  BY.INTENDING  VOTERS  l,2 
I  B  I  OK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I EC3 
I 
I  %  %  I  %  I  %  ,. 
%  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  % 
"Whatever  the  election,  I  use my  I  I  I  I 
right to vote  as  a  matter of  I  I  I  I 
principle"  I  45  40  I  40  I  55  I  60  I  58  I  32  I  52  I  46  I  60  I  51 
I  I  I  I 
"I feel  I  am  .a  citizen of·Europe  I  I  I  I 
and  it is  important  for  me  to vote  I  I  I  I 
in a  European Election"  I  36  39  I  50  I  44  I  32  I  41  I  58  I  38  I  42  I  19  I  42 
I  I  I  I 
"It will be  an opportunity  for  me  I  I  I  I 
to  show  where  I  stand  in  (national) I  I  I  I 
politics"  I  15  22  I  25  I  23  I  14  I  17  I  31  I  19  I  18  I  27  I  21  I  N 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  0 
Other reason  I  4  6  I  5  I  1  I  2  I  2  I  2  I  6  I  3  I  - I  3 
4  I 
Base  I  520  I  622  I  601  I  819  I  756  I  906  I  228  I  773  I  815  I  871  I  6 948 
I 
1  .  d  f  .  Reg1stere  voters  o  vot1ng age. 
2  Since  it was  possible  to give more  than one  answer,  totals may  exceed  100.  Don't knows  (on  average  2%)  excluded. 
3  Weighted  average. 
4  Number  of  interviewees who  answered. Table  9  -
REASONS  FOR  ABSTAINING  GIVEN  BY  INTENDING  ABSTAINERSl,Z 
r  I  B  I  OK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I  EC3 
I 
I  I  %  I  %  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  % 
I  "I hardly ever vote"  I  18  I  8  13  27  I  19  I  17  I  12  I  16  I  18  I  67  I  18 
!"Voting  in our  own  elections  is  somei  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  thing worth doing,  but  I  do  not 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  really see any  point  in voting  in a  I 
43  I  39  43  23  I  34  I  11  I  34  I  28  I  42  I  6  I  35  European  electio~'  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  "Not voting in the European Election I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  will  be  my  way  to  show  my  disagree- I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1
ment  with  (my  country's) membership  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
of the  European Connnunity"  I  12  I  24  17  11  I  11  I  4  I  10  I  10  I  19  I  7  ·I  15 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
i  ,other reason  I  I  31  ·  I  I  I  68  I  I  I  21  I  20  I 
tv  27  29  44  36  46  49  33 
4  I 
Base  I  334  I  215  I  152  I  106  I  144  I  90  I  59  I  139  I  426  I  107  I  1  638 
I  I  I  I  I·  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1,  2,  3,  4  See  notes  to  Table  8.  Don't  knows  accounted  for  slightly less  than 8%. -22-
I.4  A NATIONAL  VOTE  OR  A  EUROPEAN  VOTE? 
Since  those  who  usually vote  in national  elections are very likely to 
vote  in European elections  and  since electors clearly differentiate between 
the  two  types  of election,  an attempt  was  made  to analyse  the relationship 
more  closely by  asking  two  further  questions:  one,  which  was  new,  investi-
gated  the voter's approach  to  the European  elections;  the other,  which  had 
already been asked  in a  number of occasions,  concerned  the electorate's 
image  of their European representatives. 
1.4.1  The  voter's aP.E.roach:  national  politics or Euro:eean  :eolitics? 
"If you  wer>e  to vote in the next elections for>  the 
Eur>opean  Par>liament  this June,  would  you  tend to vote 
- Mainly  to show  your>  suppor>t  for>  the gover>nment  or>  the 
the opposition par>ties;  or> 
mainly to suppor>t  a  candidate whose  views about 
Eur>ope  ar>e  closest to  your>  own?1 
If answers  are honest  and,  more  precisely,  if _it  is possible  to  make  a 
clear distinction between national politics and  views  about  Europe,  it would 
seem that  the vast majority of intending voters will be  influenced more  by 
European considerations.than by national  politics when  they  complete  their 
ballot papers. 2 
Differences  between countries are  small.  After eliminating the don't 
knows  to achieve  a  more  accurate  comparison,  it appears  that  the Greeks  and 
Danes  are  slightly more  influenced  by national politics than voters  in other 
countries. 
(See Table  10) 
1  Question asked  on behalf of· Le  Soir and  other media organisations  in 
Community  countries. 
2  These  answers  are consistent with  those reported  above  (pp.  19-20), ~ 
Table  10 
NATIONAL  VOTE  OR  EUROPEAN  VOTE:  THE  VOTER'S  APPROACH 
---~ 
8  I  DK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  . I  GR  I EC
3 
%  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  % 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
mainly  to  show  support  for  the  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  •I  I  I 
government  or  the opposition  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  ·I 
parties  I  33  I  38  I  29  I  26  I  32  24  I  25  I  21  I  28  I  35  I  27 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
mainly  to  support  a  candidate whose  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
views  about  Europe  are  closest  to  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
their own  I  61  I  52  I  57  I  68  I  61  65  I  70  I  66  I  67  I  55  I  64 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
N 
w 
I  6  I  10  I  14  I  6  I  7  11  I  5  I  13  I  5  I  10  I  9 
I 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
2  I 
Base  I  525  I  614  I  561  I  805  I  736  I  910  I  219  I  716  I  793  I  874  I  6  774 
I  I  I  I  I  I 
1  Weighted  average. 
2  Registered voters  who  intend  to vote. !.4~ 2 
-24-
Attitude expected-of European MPs:  national  interest or Communitx 
interest? 
"Which  of the  following attitudes would  you  expect a 
member  of the European  Parliament  (from  your country)  to 
have? 
He  should support things that are  good  for  the 
European  Community  as  a whole,  even if they are 
not always  good  for  (your  country)  at the  time 
He  should support the interest of (your  country)  all 
the  time,  whether or not they are good  for  the Euro-
pean  Community  as  a whole". 
This  question was  asked  six times  between spring  1977  and  autumn  1979, 
and  then again  in March-April  1984.  Answers  are surprisingly stable  and 
clearly demonstrate  an  element  of profound  conviction associated with  general 
attitudes  towards  European  integration. 
Of  those  expressing  a  view,  on  average  one  person  in  two  gives  priority 
to  the national  interest;  this means  that  one  in two  gives priority to the 
Community  interest. 
Four  countries  (Netherlands,  followed  some  distance behind  by  Germany, 
Italy and  France)  consistently rate the Community  interest as more  important. 
Four others,  now  accompanied  by Greece,  which  is the most  "nationalistic" 
on this  issue,  expect  their representatives  to put  the national  interest 
first:  Denmark,  Ireland,  the United Kingdom  and  Belgium. 
The  results in Luxembourg  are  about  fifty-fifty but  the size of the  sample 
makes  it difficult to draw  any  conclusions. 
(See  Table  11) 
* 
*  * 
Some  readers  may  feel  that  the  replies  to the  last two  questions  are 
possibly inconsistent.  Even if we  take  the  answers  of intending voters 
only,  it is true  that,  in the  Community  as  a  whole,  seven out of every ten 
who  commit  themselves  say that  they will opt  for European  repres~ntatives 
who  support  their ideas  on  Europe,  while  only one  in two  feel  that their 
representative  should  put  the Community  interest first  in all circumstances. 
Bl!t  in .reality the  two  questions  are very. d.{fferent. Table  11 
A NATIONAL  VOTE  OR  A EUROPEAN  VOTE:  ATTITUDE  EXPECTED  OF  EUROPEAN  MPs1 
1977  (spring  and  autumn) 
"Support  things  that are  good  for 
the  European  Community  as  a  whole, 
even if they are  not  always  good 
for  (your  country)  at  the  time" 
"Support  the  interest of  (your 
country)  all the  time,  whether  or 
not  they  are  good  for the  European 
Community  as  a  whole" 
Don't  know 
Total 
1978  (spring  and  autumn) 
Community  int~rest 
National interest 
Don't  know 
Total 
1979  (spring and  autumn) 
Community  interest 
National  interest 
Don't  know 
Total 
1984  (March-April) 
Community  interest 
National  interest 
Dont't  know 
Total 
B  I  OK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I EC
2 
%  I  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  ~  I  %  -1 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
· I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
39  I  34  45  4s  I  37  I  5o  I  4s  I  63  I  41  I  :  I  46  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
43  I  49  3s  4o  I  s 1  I  43  I  44  I  2s  I  53  I  : ·  I  43  I 
1s  I  11  11  12  I  6  I  1.  I  s  I  9  I  6  I  :  I  11  I 
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~ All  those  interviewed,  including  those  under voting age  and  those not registered, 
3 
Weighted  average. 
Without  Greece  the percentages would  be  42%,  44%  and  14%. 
N 
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In his  answer  to  the first question,  the voter is  in a  way  attempting  to 
justify participation in the European  election by  saying  that his vote will 
be cast principally with  the  interests of Europe  in mind,  The  second 
question,  which  is doubtless  further  removed  from  the personal  approach  to 
voting,  deals  with  the behaviour  expected  in general  from  a  European MP  who 
has  to  choose between the  interests  of  the Community  and  the  short-term 
interests of his  own  country.  It is, of course,  more  difficult to  pronounce 
on  a  hypothetical case of conscience  than  to  justify behaviour which  one 
has  just  ackno~ledged as  being  "probable". 
Be  that  as it may,  answers  to both  questions,  at least  the  second more 
than  the first,  correlate with  propensity to vote.  The  "supranational" 
reply is more  common  among  those who  "certainly"  intend to vote  than  those 
who  are "probably"  going  to vote. 
(See  Table  12) 
Table  12 
A NAT.IONAL  VOTE  OR  A EUROPEAN  VOTE: 
VIEWS  OF  REGISTERED  VOTERS  WHO  INTEND  TO  VOTEl 
(Community  as  a whole) 
Say  that  they will vote: 
- mainly  to  show  support  for  the 
government  or  the opposition 
parties 
- mainly  to  support  a  candidate 
whose  views  about  Europe  are 
closest to their own 
Total 
Expect  their representative 
in the  European  Parliament: 
I 
- to  support  things  that are 
good  for  the European 
Community  as  a  whole 
- to  support  the  interest of 
their  country all the time 
Total 
1  .  . 
Don't knows  excluded. 
Those who  intend  to vote 
certainly  probably 
%  % 
28  35 
72  65 
100  100 
54  44 
46  56 
100  100 
"Voters"  as 








I.S  TENTATIVE  SUMMARY.OF  FACTORS'DETERMINING'PARTICIPATION  IN  THE 
EUROPEAN  ELECTIONS 
In discussing participation in the European.electi.ons  abovel,  we  made  a 
distinction between the  reasons  given by the  interviewee for voting or 
abstaining and  the other factors  which  influence his  decision:  the  former, 
which  are more  or  less conscious  or rationalized,  are  deduced  from  what  the 
interviewee  says  to "explain" his  conduct;  the latter are  revealed by 
analysis ofdata such as nationality,  sex,  age,  education,  cognitive mobi-
lization,  value  system and  socio~political attitudes.  . 
Previous  research has  shown  that participation in European elections is 
determined 'not only by  the variables which  affect participation in national 
elections but also by  the voter's attitudes to Europe  and  the  Community  and 
his  assessment  of what  is at stake,  in other words  the  importance which he 
attaches  to Parliament and  the role which  he would  like  to  see  the 
institution  ~lay.2 
These  findings  are  borne  out  by  this  survey  conducted a  few  weeks  before 
the election. 
With  the help of  the hypotheses  used  to draw up  Table  7  C
1Turnout 
projections")  and  the data which  we  have  so  far managed  to  analyse,  it is 
possible to present.the likely turnout  by  country  in terms of main  factors 
influencing  the  decision to vote. 
As  Table 13  shows,  an  average  turnout of  64%  for  the Community  as  a  whole 
would  mean  rates of  69%  for men  and  59%  for women.  · 
Opinion leaders  in all countries are more  likely to -vote  than non-leaders. 
But  the most  significant  factors  are attitudes  to  Eurppe  (Italy),  the 
Community  (Germany,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  Denmark)  and  the role desired  for 
Parliament  (United Kingdom). 
(See  Table  13) 
1  See  p.  16. 
2  Eurobarometer  No  20,  December  1983,  pp.  79-81. Table  13 
MAIN  FACTORS  DETERMINING-PARTICIPATION  IN'THE'EUROPEAN  ELECTIONS! 
(March-AEril  1984) 
I  I  B  I  OK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I  EC  I 
I  TURNOUT  PROJECTIONS  I  90-92%  I  55%  I  67%  I  73%  I  55%  I  76%  I 88-90%  I  64%  I  36%  I  81%  I  64%  I 
BY  SEX:  I  ( 2)  I  I  I  I  I  I  (2)  I  I  I  I  I. 
Men  I  I  61  I  72  I  77  I  57  I  81  I  I  68  I  42  I  83  I  69  I 
Women  I  I  50  I  63  I  69  I  53  I  71  I  I  60  I  32  I  78  I  59  I 
I 
BY  COGNITIVE  MOBILIZATION:  I  ( 2)  I  I  I  I  I  I  (2) 
Leaders  (+'+)  I  I  70  I  84  I  89  I  73  I  90  I  I  78  I  50  I  87  I  85 
(+)  I  I  66  I  72  I  79  I  64  I  82  I  I  66  I  41  I  85  I  69 
(-)  I  I  47  I  63  I  68  I  52  I  72  I  I  55  I  39  I  79  I  59 
Non-leaders  ( --)  I  I  40  I  52  I  66  I  41  I  66  I  I  49  I  21  I  69  I  54 
I 
I 
BY  ATTITUDE  TO  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATIO~:  (2)  I  I  I  I  I  I  ( 2) 
Very  much  for  I  I  79  I  82  I  87  I  76  I  89  I  I  80  I  55  I  87  I  87 
To  some  extent  for  I  I  63  I  74  I  70  I  58  I  76  I  I  61  I  37  I  81  I  63  I 
N 
00 
To  some  extent against  I  I  53  I  54  I  66  I  50  I  62  I  I  51  I  29  I  82  I  48 
Very  much  against  I  I  62  I  (42)  I  (58)  I  40  I  (55)  I  I  (27)  I  39  I  81  I  52 
I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
BY  VIEW  OF  COMMUNITY  MEMBERSHIP:  I  (2)  I  I  I  I  I  I  (2) 
Good  thing  I  I  72  I  84  I  79  I  71  I  81  I  I  70  I  49  I  86  I  78 
Neither  good  nor bad  I  I  45  I  55  I  65  I  42  I  66  I  I  44  I  28  I  78  I  48 
Bad  thing  I  I  60  I  43  I  64  I  41  I  69  I  I  (28)  I  32  I  84  I  45 
I 
BY  ROLE  DESIRED  FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
PARLIAMENT:  I  ( 2)  I  I  I  I  I  I  ( 2)  I  I 
More  important  I  I  75  I  86  I  81  I  69  I  82  I  I  74  I  50  I  84  I  81 
About  the  same  I  I  67  I  67  I  71  I  57  I  71  I  I  66  I.  36  I  77  I  55 
Less  important  I  I  59  I  55  I  64  I  44  I  (74)  I  I  34  I  27  I  68  I  38 
1  The  basic  projections are derived  from  the  results of the  survey,  adjusted  using  the hypotheses  explained  on  p.  16 
to give  the  figures  listed on  p.  18.  Turnout  projections  by  determining  factors  are  taken direct  from  the survey 
results.  Percentages  in brackets have  been calculated on  a  base of  less  than n  = 30.· 
2  Since voting  is  compulsory  in Belgium and  Luxembourg  and  failure  to  turn out  is penal.ized,  there  is no  point  in 
breaking  down  voting  figures  by  reference  to the determining factors  which  apply  in  the other countries. . 
CHAPTER  II 
ATTITUDES  TOWARDS  EUROPE 
AND  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY -30-
II 
ATTITUDES  TOWARDS  EUROPE  AND  THE 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Since this  issue of Eurobarometer  is concerned  mainly with  the elections 
to  the European Parliament,  we  will  touch only briefly on  the replies  to  the 
regular questions  in order  to  devote more  space  to the  new  ones. 
II.l  FOR  OR  AGAINST  WESTERN  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
"In general,  are  you  for>  or against efforts being made 
to unify Western  Europe?  If for,  are  you  very muoh  for, 
or only to  some  extent?  If against,  are  you  only to 
some  extent against,  or very muoh  against?" 
The  results  show  that  support has  declined  somewhat  over the  last six 
months  in several  countries,  no  doubt  as  a  result of the  failures of the 
European Councils  in Athens  (4-6 December  1983)  and  Brussels  (19-20  March 
1984),  but only  in the  United  Kingdom  and  Greece  is  the  shift significant. 
Despite this  fluctuation,  a  large majority  in all countries other than 
Denmark  continue to  support  European unification. 
(See  Table  14) 
Notes  to accompany  Table  14  on  p.  31: 
1  Excluding Northern  Ireland  in 1973. 
2  Weighted  average. 
3  In 1973  and  1975  this  question  included  a  possible reply of "indifferent"; 
the  percentages  for  this reply have  been  added  to  the "don't knows".  The 
altered wording may  partly explain the  subsequent  drop  in "don't knows". 
4  "Very much  for" = 4,  "very much  against" = 1;  "don't knows"  excluded. 
5  Only  three surveys,  the first in October  1980. September  1973 
Very  much  for 
-31-
Table  14 
SUPPORT  FOR  WESTERN  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
0973-84) 
I  B  I  OK  0  F  I  I RL  L  NL  UK1  GR  I EC
2 
I  %  l  %  %  %  I  %  %  %  %  %  %  I  % 
I  22  I  11  4  9  2  3  I  21  34  41  34  14  I  3  o 
To  soine  extent :for  I  38  I  28  29  45  I  31  36  33  39  23  I  33 
To  some  extent against I  3  I  14  4  3  I  8  2  8  15  I  6 
Very  much  against  I  2  .1  18  2  1  I  4  1  7  15  I  5 
Don't  know  I  35  I  23  16  28  I  36  27  19  12  33  I  .26 
Tota14  Index 
1-1~0~0~-1~0-0~-1-00--r-1-00~~~  -1~00~~10~0~--10-0~-1-0-0~-1-0-0~----r-1-00--T 
1  3.24  2.56  3.5o  3.25 I 3.o7  3.41  3.57  3.15  2.53  3.19 
1975-81· (nine  surveys) I  I 
Very  much  for  I  23  15  37  24  I  22  38 
To  some  extent  for  I  41  30  40  51  I  40  44 
To  some  extent against I  5  18  6  6  I  10  5 
Very  much  against  I  2  17  2  2  I  4 
Don't  know  I  29  20  15  17  I  24  12 
Total4 
Index  I  100 
3.20 
April  +  Oct. ·82  (comb.~  I 
Very much  for  I  22  I  12 
To  some  extent  for  I  42  I  30 
To  some  extent against I  7  I  19 
Very  much  against  I  7  I  18 
Don't  know  I  27  I  21 
Tota14  Index  I  100 
3.16 
I 
32  I 
4:  1 
3  I 
11  I 
I 
26  I  t6  32 
52  I  4o  46 
6  I  11  6 
1  I  4  1 
15  ·I  29  1s 
45  33 
39  43 
7  7 
2  4 
7  13 
I 
38  I  28 
4o  I  47 
9  I  1o 
2  I  5 












34  29 
28  42 
10  8 
10  4 
18  17 
I 
33  I  21 
29  · I  45 
1  I  9 
6  I  3 
25  I  16 
April  1983  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Very  much  for  I  27  I  13  36  I  25  I  16  I  36  I  39  I  29  I  20  I  31  I  29 
To  some  extent  for  I  41  I  32  49  I  50  I  39  I  44  I  39  I  46  I  40  I  30  I  45 
To  some  extent against I  6  I  19  5  I  5  I  9  I  5  I  8  I  10  I  15  I  6  I  6 
Very  much  against  I  1  18  1  I  1  I  4  I  1  I  3  I  5  I  5  I  6  I  3 
Don't  know  I  25  18  9  I  19  I  32  I  14  I  11  I  10  I  20  I  27  I  15 
Tota14 
Index 
October  1983 
I  too  1oo  too  1oo  I  too  too  I  1oo  1  1oo  too  1oo  1  1oo  1 
1  3.25  2.48  3.3o  3.2o I 2.98  3.34 I 3.27 I 3.11  2.93  3.17  I 3.18  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I 
Very much  for  I  23  12  34  29  I  21  35  I  47  I  33  29  40  I  31  I 
To  some  extent  for  I  48  27  42  50  I  41  45  I  32  I  39  41  29  I  44  I 
To  some  extent against I  7  20  6  7  I  7  5  [  9  I  9  9  5  I  7  I 
Very much  against  I  3  23  2  2  I  4  2  3  I  6  5  5  I  3  I 
Don'tknow  I  19  18  16  12  I  27  13  9  I  13  16  21  I  15  I 
Total4  Index 
March~April 1984 
Very much  for 
I  100  100  100  100  I 100  100  100  100  100  100  I 100 
I  3.13  1  2.34  3.27  3.21  I 3.o7  3.31  3.35  3.13  3.12  3.33 I 3.21 
I  I  I  I 
I  2o  I  11  21  29  I  11  28  43  3o  11  28  I  25 
To  some  extent  for  I  47  I  25  45  52  I  41  I  49  39  51  45  29  I  46 
To  some  extent  against I  9  I  20  10  6  I  9  I  7  6  7  16  11  I  10 
Very  much  against  I  3  I  23  3  2  I  4  I  1  2  3  7  9  I  ·  4 
Don't  know  I  21  I  21  15  11  I  29  I  15  10  9  15  23  I  15 
Tota14 
Index 
~~10~0-,~l~O~O~~l~O~O-r~l~OO~r7l~OO~J17 10~0~~10~0-.-1~0~0~~1~07 0-r~l~OO~r-17 00~J 
1  3.o8  2.3o  3.15  3.21  .3.oo I 3.23  3.18  3.19  2.85  2.98  3.to  I·  · 
2  3  4  5  :  see  previous  page. -32-
II.2  ATTITUDES  TOWARDS  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
II.2.1  Preferre4  name  for  "the·Coliiiiturtity" 
Newspapers,  radio  and  television,  even official publications  and  speeches 
all bear witness  to  the  fact  that  the name  "the European  Community"  is  far 
from  standard usage.  Lawyers  rightly use  the  term  in.the Treaties:  "the 
European  Communities"  (European Coal  and  Steel  Community,  European Economic 
Community  and  European Atomic  Energy  Community).  But  that  is  a  kind  of  legal 
fabrication.  The  social  and  political truth is that  there·is a  "European 
Community".  Hence  the decision by  Parliament  and  the  Council  in  1978  to 
encourage  the use of this name  in official documents  "as. far  as  may  be 
possible and  appropriate"1•  This  policy has  also been  adopted  by  the  Court 
of Justice when  referring to  the entity rather than to  the  instruments which 
govern it.  Journalists,  for their part,  have  invented or  sanctioned a  number 
of simpler  or  shorter names:  "the Common  Market",  of course,  to refer to  the 
European Economic  Community,  and  a~host of others,  which  may  vary  from 
language  to  language  and  include abbreviations  such as  CEE,  EEC,  MEC  and  EWG, 
and  names  involving numbers  such  as  "Europe of  the Ten"  or simply "the Ten". 
Such  a  proliferation of  terms  could well  generate  or  perpetuate confusion. 
We  therefore tried to discover people's  preferences  by  asking  the  following 
question: 
"Your>  country and  nine other>  European  countries 
belong to  "the European  Community",  which is also 
called "the  Common  Market",  or>  E. E. C.  or>  "The  Ten". 
Among  these names  is there one  you  prefer>  and which 
one?"  (Show  CARD) 
The  first finding  was  that  nearly one  person in every  three  questioned 
had  no  preference;  the  proportion was  as  high as  44%  in Denmark,  48%  in 
Belgium and  51%  in Greece. 
Among  those  who  expressed an op1n1on,  the  majority  in most  countries were 
in favour  of "the European  Community".  The  British more  readily use."the 
Common  Market",  while  the Greeks  are equally divided  between "the European 
Community"  and  the "European Economic  Community"  and  the Danes  between "the 
European  Community"  and  abbreviated titles. 
In short,  the  countries  most  in favour  of European unification and 
Community  membership  show  a  greater preference  for  the name  "the European 
Community". 
(See Table  15) 
1  For  references  and  comments  see  the  introduction by Giancarlo Olmi  to 
Thirty years  of  Co~unity law  (Brussels,  1982)  pp.  3  and  4, I "The .European  Community" 
I "The  European  Economic  Community" 
1  "The  European  Communities" 
I "The  Common  Market" 
I 
1 "Europe  of the Ten" 
IEC,  EEC  or other name  or abbrev. 
I  I  Total 
I  "Don't  know or "no  preference" 
I 
Weighted  average. 
Table  15 
PREFERRED  NAME  FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
B  DK  D  F  IRL  I  I  L  NL  UK  GR  I Ec
1 
%  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  ~--%- r·  %  I  %---,  .  i(-- I  %  I  %  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
32  I  26  I  56  I  32  I  34  I  45  I  52  I  44  I  30  I  26  I  4o  I 
19  I  1  I  14  I  18  I  13  I  22  I  1  I  2s  I  12  I  2s  I  11  I 
9  I  16  I  3  I  10  I  11  I  1  I  8  I  6  I  1o  I  8  I  8  I 
16  I  19  I  11  I  12  I  19  I  13  I  9  I  8  I  33  I  13  I  11 
11  I  s  I  6  I  23  I  4  I  9  I  11  I  s  I  2  I  19  I  10 
1  I  21  I  10  I  s  I  19  I  4  I  13  I  12  I  13  I  9  I  8 
100  100  100  100  100  1oo  . I  1oo  100  100  100 
,..  I  ·r- - T.  I  - . I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I .  I  I  I 
I  48%  I  44%  I  32%  I  21%  I  35%  I  23%  I  28%  I  29%  I  31%  I  s1%  I 
I  I  _I_  __  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1oo  I 
1 
I 




But  the relationship that  can be observed  between what  is being described 
and  the  "words  for it" is not  just at country level,  which would  have 
suggested  that  the  influence was  each  country's cultural characteristics and 
linguistic practices.  If we  look at  the  choice of  term in relation to the 
attitude of the  person  concerned  towards  Community  membership,  it can be 
seen that  those who  consider it "a  good  thing"  are more  likely to prefer 
the  name  "the European. Community",  whereas  those who  are against it prefer 
the more  restrictive name  "the Common  Market". 
These  are  not  neutral  terms, 
(See  Table  16) 
11.2.2  Benefits  (or otherwise)  of Community  membership  in relation to 
othet Commurtity·courttties 
The  following  question.,  first- asked  in spring  1983,  was  asked  again  in 
March-April  1984: 
Taking everything into  consideration~ would you 
say that  (your  country)  has  on  balance benefited or 
not  from  being a  member  of the European  Community 
(Common  Market)?  If YES:  "Has  it benefited more 
or less  than the other member  countries of the Euro-
pean  Community"? 
While  it is true that  in all countries  except  the United Kingdom  the 
majority of respondents  felt that  their country had  benefited  from 
Community  membership,  this view has  lost  ground  over  the last twelve months, 
particularly in Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  Belgium, 
(See  Table  17) 
Of  those who  consider  that  their country has benefited,  most  think that 
it has  benefited as  much  as  the other countries or do  not  know.  Again  the 
United  Kingdom  is a  notable  exception:  the majority opinion  - even  among 
the minority who  consider that  the  country has  benefited  from  Community 
membership  - is that it has  benefited less  than other countries. 
It is worth  noting  that  among  the Greeks,  who  admittedly are relative 
newcomers  to  the  Community,  even  those who  acknowledg~ that their CQuntry 
has  benefited  from  membership  feel  that  they  come  off worse  than other 
countries.  And  the Italians,  whose  pro-European attitudes have  been 
demonstrated  time  and  time  again,  allow a  degree of bitterness to creep in 
here. 
(See Table  18) -35-
Table  16 
PREFERRED  NAME  FOR  THE  COMMUNITY  IN  RELATION  TO  ATTITUDE 
TOWARDS  COMMUNITY  MEMBERSHIP 
(Community  as  a  whole) 
Consider their  country's memership 
of the European  Community: 
A good  thing  Neither  good  A bad 
nor bad  thing 
%  %  % 
"The  European  Conununity"  46  32  29 
"The  European Economic 
Community"  17  18  14 
"The  Common  Market"  13  21  25 
"Europe  of  the  Ten"  10  11  10 
"The  European  Communities"  7  9  10 
Other  7  9  12 
TOTAL1  100  100  100 
uDon ' t  know"  or  "no  preferrence"  19%  33%  45% 
1 .Don't  knows  excluded. Table  17 
VIEWS  ON  WHETHER  OR.NOT  ONEiS  COUNTRY  HAS  BENEFITED  FROM  COMMUNITY  MEMBERSHIP 
8  I  OK  0  F  I  IRL  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  GR  Ec1 
%  %  %  %  I  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  %  % 
March-April  1983  I  I  I  I  I 
Consider their country  has benefited  I  I  I  I 
from  Community  membership:  I  59  51  49  54  I  56  69  I  74  78  I  32  44  52 
I  I  I 
- more  than the others  I  11  9  8  5  I  16  13  I  15  14  I  4  8  8 
- less than  the others  I  8  6  16  12  I  15  19  I  13  10  I  15  13  15 
- about  as much2  I  35  24  10  27  I  20  24  I  36  42  I  7  9  18 
- don't  know  I  5  12  15  10  I  5  13  I  10  12  I  6  14  11 
Consider  their country has not  I  I  I  I 
benefited  from  Community  membership  I  6  31  15  21  I  28  14  I  12  11  I  57  25  25 
Don't  know  I  35  18  36  25  I  16  17  I  14  11  I  11  31  23 
w 
100  100  100  100  I  100  100  I  100  100  I  100  100  100 
a--
Total  I 
March-April  1984  I  I  I 
Consider  their country has benefited  I  I  I 
from  Community  membership:  I  49  I  42  I  39  I  50  I  59  I  58  I  73  I  67  I  32  I  44  I  46 
I  I 
- more  than  the others  I  7  I  10  I  7  I  5  I  24  I  10  I  15  I  16  I  3  I  7  I  7 
- less than  the others  I  7  I  6  I  9  I  8  I  13  I  19  I  10  I  9  I  17  I  17  I  13 
- about  as much2 
I 
28  I  ~ 
26( 3) l 
11  I 
31  l 
15  I 
18  I 
36  I 
32  I 
7  I 
8  I 
17 
- don't  know  7  2  6  7  11  12  10  5  12  9 
Consider their country has not  I  I  I 
benefited  from  Community  membership  I  22  I  34  I  24  I  24  I  29  I  20  I  14  I  17  I  56  I  35  I  30 
Don't  know  I  29  I  24  I  37  I  26  I  12  I  22  I  13  I  16  I  12  I  21  I  24 
Total  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I 
1  Weighted  average. 
2  Volunteered. 
3  Owing  to a  technical error one reply code was  omitted  in Denmark. .Table  18 
VIEWS  ON  WHETHER  ONE'S  COUNTRY  HAS  BENEFITED  MORE  OR  LESS.THAN  THE  OTHERS.FROM  COMMUNITY  MEMBERSHIP 
March-April  1983 
Consider their country has benefited 
from  Community  membership: 
- more  than  the others 
- less than the others  .  z 
- about  as much 
- don't know 
Total 
Reminder ·of  percentages of 
positive replies 
March-April  1984 
Consider  their country has benefited 
from  Community  membership: 
- - more  than  the others 
- - less  than  the others 
-- about  as much2 
- don't know 
Reminder  of  percentages  of 
positive  replies 
Weighted  average. 
2  Volunteered. 
Total 
B  I 
%  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  18  I 
I  14  I 
I  59  I 
I  9  I 
I  100  I 
I 
I  59%  I 
I  1 
I  I 
1  1 
I  15  I 
I  14  I 
I 
58 
I  ~  13 
I  100  I 
I 
I  49%  I 
OK  I  D  I  F  I 
%  I  %  I  %  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
17  I  16  I  8  I 
13  I  33  I  22  I 
46  I  21  I  51  I 
24  I  30  I  19  I 
100  I  100  I  100  I 
51%  I  49%  I  54%  I 
I  I  I 
1  1  I 
I  I  1 
23  1  18  I  9  I 
14  I  24  I  16  I 




I  29  13 
100  I  100  I  100  I 
42%  I  39%  I  50%  I 
3  Owing  to  a  technical  error one  reply code  was  omitted  in Denmark. 
IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR 
%  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  ,%  I  % 
I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I  I 
30  I  19  I  20  I  18  I  14  I  20 
27  I  28  I  17  I  13  I  46  I  29 
35  I  34  I  49  I  54  I  21  I  20 
8  I  19  I  14  I  15  I  19  I  31 
100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
56%  I  69%  I  74%  I  78%  1  32%  1  44% 
I  I  I  I  I 
I  1  1  I  I 
I  I  I  1  I 
41  I  18  I  20  I  24  I  8  I  15 












11  18  16  14  17  29 
100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
59%  I  58%  I  73%  I  67%  I  32%  I  44% 
I  EC1 
I  %  I 
I  I 
I 
I 
I  16 
I  28 
I  35 
I  21 
I  100  I 
I  52%·  1  ....... 
-...J  -
I  I 
1  I 
I  1 
I  15  I 
I  28  I 
I 
37 
I  20 
I  100  I 
I  46%  I -38-
II.2.3  Which  countries  should  not  be  in the  Community? 
Questions  have  been asked  a  number  of  times  on Europeans'  op1n1ons  of 
and  attitudes  towards  one  another  in an attempt  not  to  perpetuate prejudice 
but  to  assess  areas  of  agreement. 
As  far  back as  autumn  1976  we  asked  the  following  question,  which  has 
just been re-used  in the  survey  carried out  for  Parliament  and  a  group of 
media organizations. 
"This is a  list of the countries belonging to the 
European  Community  (Common  Market).  (Show  CARD)  Among 
these countries of the·European  Community~  are there 
any~  including your  ownJ  you  would prefer not to be  in 
the Community?  Whiah  ones?''1 
What  is clear at first glance  is that  in 1984  as  in 1976  a  large majority 
of interviewees would  not  exclude  any  country  from  the Community,  though 
the proportion is significantly smaller:  seven out  of  ten in 1976;  six 
out of ten  in 1984, 
The  other point  to note  is  that  in 1984  only one  country got  a  large 
number  of negative votes:  the United  Kingdom,  from  25%  of  interviewees  in 
the  Conununity as  a  whole,  33%  in Germany,  38%  in Luxembourg  and  41%  in 
France.  (Conversely,  25%  of the British said that  they would  like to  see 
France  leave  the Community). 
The  percentage of Danes  (18%)  and  British  (12%)  who  would  prefer their 
own  country not  to be  in the Community  is surprisingly low,  possibly  as  a 
result of the relative complexity of the question,  which  certainly partly 
accounts  for  the  number  of don't knows. 2 
Be  that  as  it may,  the replies are  an  indicator of  tension,  both  in 
general attitudes  towards  the Conununity  and.attitudes  - influenced by 
current  events  ~  towards  other countries. 
1 
2 
(See  Table  19) 
This  was  followed  by  a  list of the  ten member  countries  of  the  Community 
(without  Greece  in 1979). 
As  a  matter of interest,  the  proportion of  those who  replied who  would 
exclude their own  country was  47%  in Denmark  and  28%  in the  United  King-
dom.  By  comparison,  38%  of the Danes  who  replied would  prefer  the 
British not  to  be  in the Community  and  17%  of the British felt  the  same 
way  about  the  Danes. :e 
/ 
Table  19 
1  Totals  exceed  100  since  it was  possible  to give more  than one  answer. 
2  Weighted  average. II.2.4 
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Views  on  Community  membership 
"GeneraUy  speaking,  do  you  think that (your 
country's) membership of the European  Community 
(Common  Market)  is a  good  thing,  a  bad  thing,  or 
·.neither .good nor bad?" 
There has  been little change  over  the  last  six months,  barring a  slight 
increase  in positive views  in France  and  a  slight drop  in Greece, 
Despite difficulties  and  tensions,  views  on  Community  membership  remain 
positive in aU  the  member  countries,  including  the United Kingdom  and  Denmark. 
In Denmark,  however;  the  gap  between  the numbers  re.plying  •ia  good  thing"  and 
"a bad  thing"  is  statistically insignificant,  and  most  Danes  seem more  or 
less  resigned  to  Community  membership rather than enthusiastic  about  staying 
in or keen  to  get  out.  · 
(See  Table  20) 
II.3  GOALS  AND  ASPIRATIONS  FOR  THE  YEARS  AHEAD 
We  will end  this  issue of Eurobarometer with  the  replies  to two  questions 
asked  in the  survey  carried out  for  the  European Parliament  and  a  group  of  . 
media organizations. 
II. 3.1  Priorities  for  joint Community  action 
"Of  the  foUowing  areas  (Show  CARD),  on  which  two 
do  you  think  the  countries of the European  Community 
working  together shoul-d  concentrate their efforts in 
the.next 5 or.6 years?" 
One  area emerges  clearly in all countries:  job  creation,  followed  (at 
quite  some  distance)  by  social welfare.  Other  issues  assume  varying 
importance  depending  on the·country:  in Greece  and  Italy agriculture is 
highly rated;  in France  and  the United Kingdom  defence;  in Greece  and  Ireland 
help  to  the  poorer parts of Europe;  in France  scientific research;  and  in 
the Netherlands  help  to  the Third World. 
Table  21  shows  overall  figures  and  Table  22  gives  a  clearer indication of 
the order  of preference  by  country. 
(See Tables  21  and  22) September  1973 
Good  thing 
Neither  good  nor  bad 
Bad  thing 
Don't  know 
Total3  Index 
1974-81  (16  survezs) 
Good  thing 
Neither  good  nor bad 
Bad  thing 
Don't  know 
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B  OK  o  F  IRL  r  L  I  NL  I  uK1  GR  Ec2 
%  I  %  I  %  %  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  %  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
57  I  ~oz  I  63  61  56  I·  69  I  67  I  63  I  31  I  56  I 
I'  19  I  19  I  2  2  2  2  21  I  15  I  2  2  I  20  I  22  I  20  I 
I  5  I  3o  I  t.  5  15  I  2  I  3  I  4  I  34  I  u  I 
I  19  I  9  I  11  12  8  I  14  I  B  I  13  I  13  I  13  I 
~~1~o~o-r(~10~0~(~1~0~0-r~10~0~-1~0~0-r(~1~00~~-1~07 0-rl~1~00~\-1~07 0~(---.~107 0~l 
1 2.64  I  2.13  I  z.66  2.64  2.45  I  2.78  I  2.1o  I  2.68  I  1.97  I  2.52  I 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  (4l  I 
I  6o  I  35  I  59  51  ·  53  I  73  I  75  75  I  34  I  4o  56  I 
I  21  I  26  I  25  28  I  22  I  16  I  15  14  I  22  I  26  23  I 
I  4  I  29  I·  6  1  I  19  I  4  I  4  4  I  37  I  21  13  I 
I  15  I  10  I  10  8  I  6  I  7  I  6  7  I  7  I  13  8  ·I 
Total3  ~~10~0~~~~~1-~~~~~~1-~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Index  I 2.66 
~ril +Oct.  1982  (com~.) 
Good  thing  1  52 
Neither good  nor  bad  I  24 
Bad  thing  6 
Don 
1 t  know  18 
I 
35  ·1 
29  I 
26  I 
1o  I 
I 
56  I 
Jo  I 
1  I 
1  I 
I  I  .I 
55  I  46  I  67  I  12 
29  I  28  1  19  I  zo 
8  I  20  1  5  I  4 
8  I  6  I  9  I  4 
1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo 
I 
75  I  28 
15  I  28 
5  I  38 










1oo  I  Tota13  Index  2.55  I  2.1o  I  2.53  I  .z.5o  I  2.21  I  2.69  I  2.1o  z.74  I 1.9o  2.36  2.42  I 
April  1983 
Good  thing 
Neither  good  nor  bad 
Bad  thing 
Don't  know 
Tota13  Index 
October·1983 
Good  th1ng 
Neither good  nor  bad 
Bad  thing 
Don't know 
Total3  Index 
March-April  1984  . - Good  th1ng 
Neither  good  nor bad 
Bad  thing 
Don't  know 
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1oo  f  .1oo  I 1oo 
·2.66 I 2.1o  I 2.53 
I 
59  I  31  53 
25  I  3o  31 
1  I  29  5 
9  I  10  11 
100 
2.58 
I  I  I 
s  3  I  45  I  10 
3o  I  28  I  18 
72 
16 
n  I  28  42 
I 
53  I 
25  I 
13  I 
15  I  29  29 
1  I  zo  I  4 
1o  I  1  I  8 
5 
5 
4  I  36  I  12 
4  I  1  I  11  9  I 
I 
55  I  42 
29  I  26 
9  I  25 
1  I  1 
I 
7.6  1  70 
11  I  16 
- 5  I  6 





1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo  1  1oo  1oo 
2.49  I 2.18 I 2.1o I 2.73  2.81 
I  I  I 
62  I  43  I  1o  I  6o  8o 
21  I  21  I  20  I  14  13 
4  I  23  I  3  I  3  3 













1oo  I 1oo  I 1oo . 
z.o9  I 2.4o I 2.47 
I 
34  36  I  55 
Jo  35  I  21 
Jo  16  I  u 
6  9  I  1 
1  Excluding Northern Ireland  in 1973  and  1974. 
2  Weighted  average. 
3  "Good  thing" = 3,  "neither good  nor bad" = 2,  "bad  thing" = 1;  "Don't knows" 
excluded. 
4  Only  three surveys,  the first  in October  1980. Creating  jobs  I 
Social welfare  I 
Defence  I 
Agriculture  I 
Help  to  poorer parts of Europe  I 
Scientific research  I 
Help  to  the  Third World  I 
Don't  know  I 
Table  21 
PRIORITIES  FOR  JOINT  COMMUNITY  ACTION 
IN  THE  NEXT  FIVE  OR  SIX  YEARS1 
8  I  DK  I  D  I  F  IRL  I  I 
%  I  %  I  %  I  %  %  I  % 
82  I  66  I  68  I  75  87  I  76 
36  I  28  I  30  I  20  29  I  18 
14  I  10  I  16  I  26  10  I  16 
14  I  19  I  17  I  19  24  I  27 
10  I  14  I  15  I  11  25  I  19 
14  I  13  I  12  I  24  6  I  16 
7  I  22  I  9  I  16  18  I  15 
5  I  10  I  13  I  3  1  i  2 
I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I Ec2 
I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I 
I  85  I  73  I  77  I  49  I  73 
I  49  I  38  I  35  I  32  I  27 
I  8  I  13  I  24  I  20  I  19 
I  10  I  11  I  12  I  32  I  19 
I  11  I  9  I  16  I  33  I  16 
I  12  I  9  I  12  I  12  I  15 
I  22  I  23  I  16  I  11  I  14 
i  I  2  i  3  i  4  i  5  i 
1  Since it was  possible to  give  two  answers,  totals exceed  100,  The  areas  are  listed in order of positive replies 
for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 




Table  22 
PRIORITIES  FOR  JOINT  COMMuNITY  ACTION  BY  COUNTRY 
BELGIUM  DENMARK  GERMANY  FRANCE 
Jobs  82%  Jobs  66%  Jobs  68%  Jobs 
Social welfare  36  Social welfare  28  Social welfare  30  Defence 
Defence  14  Third world  22  Agriculture  17  Scientffic research 
Agriculture  14  Agriculture  19  Defence  16  Social welfare 
Scientific research  14  Poorer areas  14  Poorer areas  15  Agriculture 
Poorer areas  10  Scientific research  13  Scientific research  12  Third world 
Third world  7  Defence  10  Third world  9  Poorer areas 
ITALY  LUXEMBOURG  NETHERLANDS  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Jobs  76%  Jobs  85%  ·Jobs  73%  Jobs 
Agriculture  27  Social. welfare  49  Social welfare  38  Social welfare 
Poorer areas  19  Third world  22  Third world  23  Defence 
Social welfare  18  Scientific research  12  Defence  13  Poorer areas 
-Scientific research  16  Poorer areas  11  Agriculture  11  Third world 
Defence  16  Agriculture  10  Poorer areas  9  Agriculture 
Third world  15  Defence  8  Scientific research  9  Scientific research 
..  - - ------- -· -- ---- --- --- ------
IRELAND 
75%  Jobs 
26  Social welfare 
24  Poorer areas 
20  Agriculture 
19  Third world 
16  Defence 
11  Scientific research 
GREECE 
77%  Jobs 
35  Poorer areas 
24  Agriculture 
16  Social welfare 
16  Defence 
12  Scientific research 
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II.3.2  A "mock"  referendum Ort  various  aspects of Eu:to£_ean  irtteg:tation 
"Supposing  you  were  asked to vote on  the  following  ideas~ 
whioh  would  then apply to all countries equally in the  Euro-
pean  Community.  Would  you vote for  or against? 
,;....  To  give all citizens of European  Community  countries the 
possibility to get a  European  passport whioh  enables  them 
to travel without hindrance in the ten countries 
- To  have  a  European  ourrenoy as well as our  own~  with 
notes and  ooins that oould be used everywhere in the  ten 
countries of the European  Community  in the  same  way  we 
use our  (national)  ourrenoy 
- In the next Olympia  games~  instead of ten teams  represent~ 
ing the ten European  countries~  send one  European  team 
representing the best of the European  Community  as a 
whole 
- Make  it possible to arrest and bring to trial anyone 
aooused of a  serious orime1  even if they  have  taken 
refuge in another oountry of the Community 
- To  have  only one  ambassador  to represent the ten 
countries of the Community  in Washington  or in Mosoow 
- A  fi~ hiring staff oan  ohoose  people  from  any  oountry 
of the European  Community  as well as a  (national) 
- You  reoeive the  same  sooial benefit and payments  as in 
the other countries of the Community  neither more  nor 
less 
- It will be  forbidden  to prevent products of another 
oountY'y  of the European  Community  from  being sold here 
The  replies to  these eight  questions  confirm that  a  European  consensus 
exists.  With a. few  exceptions,  which  we  will  come  back  to,· all countries 
approved  or disapproved of the  same  ideas. 
Firstly, the  ideas which  were well  received: 
- eight Europeans  in ten are  in favour  of a  European legal area within 
which  it would  be  po.ssible  to arrest and· bring to trial anyone  accused 
of a  serious  crime  who  had  sought  refuge  in another Community  country; 
- similarly,  eight  in ten are  in favour  of all Community  citizens having 
a  European  passport;  · 
about  six Europeans  in ten are  in  favour  of harmonizing welfare 
benefits  throughout  the Community  (although  the majority of Danes 
are  aga  ins.t) ; • 
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- there  is  a  similar majority  support  for  the  creation of a  European 
currency,  but  again  the majority of Danes  and  a  substantial minority 
of  the British are against; 
- on average  almost  as many  endorse  the principle that  a  firm recruiting 
staff should be able  to  choose  a  citizen from another Community 
country,  but  the majority of Danes  are against; . 
- 45%  of Europeans  are  in favour  of banning  protectionism against 
products  from other Community  countries;  here,  however,  national 
differences  are more  marked  with  the  Italians very much  in favour 
and  a  clear majority of the British and  the Danes  against. 
Only  two  of  the  ideas  mooted met  with  opposition,  but  in both  cases it 
was  quite unequivocal.  In no  country would  the majority of citizens  agree 
to  only one  ambassador  representing the  ten  Cornrnunity·countries  in Moscow 
or Washington  or  one  European  team being  sent  to the next  Olympic  Garnes. 
·It would  seem tqat  less  importance  is attached to  the  substance of sovereignty 
than  to  some  of its  symbols. 
(See Table  23) 
* 
*  * 
If we  look not  at  the details but  at the.results as  a  whole,  we  can  see 
that the country which,  on  average,  cast the  greatest  number  of votes  in 
favour  of the  proposals  was  Italy  (on  average  72%  "fors"  and  16%  "againsts"), 
followed  by Luxembourg,  Greece,  France  and  Belgium. 
In the United  Kingdom  the "fors"  just outweighted  the "againsts". 
Denmark  is  the  only country where,  on average,  there were more  "againsts" 
than "fors". 
(See  Table  24) 
* 
*  * 
The  main  purpose of this  question was  not  to hand  out  trophies but  to 
investigate  a  structure of opinion. 
It is  simply an  indicator,  throwing  up results  at  national  level which 
correlate strongly with  general  attitudes  towards  European unification and 
Community  membership. Table·23 
''MOCK"  .  EUROPEAN 'REFERENDUM I 
B  DK  .  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I Ec2  . I 
%  r -%-T- % .  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I 
"Make  it possible to arrest and  bring to 
trial anyone  accused of a  serious  crime, 
even if they have  taken refuge in another 
country of the Community" 
For 
Against 
Don't  know 
"To  give all citizens of European 
Community  countries the possibility to 
get  a  European passport which  enables 





"You  receive the  same  social benefit 
and  payments  as in the other countries 
of the Community,  neither more  nor less" 
For 
Against 
Don't  know 
"To  have  a  European  currency as well as 
our  own,  with notes snd  coins that  could 
be used everywhere  in the  ten countries 
of  the  European  Community  in the  same 
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1  The  ideas  are listed in order of average votes  in favour  ("fors" minus  "againsts")  for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
The  total  for  each· idea  adds  up  to  100. 










"""  0\ Table  23  (contd.) 
"MOCK"  EUROPEAN  REFERENDUM!  -·-
B  I  DK  I  D  I  F  I  IRL  I  I  I  L  I  NL  I  UK  I  GR  I EC2 
%  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I  %  I 
"A  firm hiring staff can  choose  people  from  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  any  country of  the  European  Community  as 
well as a  (national)"  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
For  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
47  I  34  I  55  I  55  I  47  I  82  I  59  I  52  I  52  I  59'  I  59 
Against  39  I  46  I  29  I  33  I  34  I  8  I  33  I  36  I  37  I  29  I  28 
Don't  know  14  I  20  I  16  I  12  I  19  I  10  I  8  I  12  I  11  I  12  I  13 
"It will be  forbidden  to prevent produch 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  of another country  of  the European 
Community  from  being sold here"  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
For  40  I  27  I  40  I  40  I  37  I  75  I  52  ·I  38  I  31  I  44  I  45 
Against  42  I  48  I  37  I  44  I  45  I  9  I  41  I  52  I  56  I  40  I  38 
Don't  know  18  I  25  I  23  ·1  16  I  18  I  16  I  7  I  10  I  13  I  16  I  17 
"To  have  only one  ambassador  to represent  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I·  I  .,. 
the  ten countries of the Community  in  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  ..  --.J 
Washington or in Moscow" 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
For  36  I  12  I  22  I  29  I  27  I  34  I  34  I  26  I  13  I  25  I  24 
Against  40  I  69  I  58  I  55  I  53  I  42  I  52  I  60  I  78  I  51  I  58 
Don't  know  24  I  19  I  20  I  16  I  20  I  24  I  14  I  14  I  9  I  24  I  18 
"In the next Olympic  Games,  instead of  '  '  '  I  I  I  I  I  I 
ten teams  representing  the  ten  European  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
countries,  send  one  European  team  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
representing the best of the  European  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  Community  as a  whole" 
I  I  I  1  I  I  I  I  I 
t  For  I  35  I  7  I  18  I  35  I  17  I  37  I  32  I  23  I  12  I  36  I  25 
I  Aginst  I  41  I  77  I  62  I  50  I  70  I  46  I  51  I  59  I. 81  I  40  I  59 
Don't  know  I  24  I  16  I  20  I  15  I  13  I  17  I  17  I  18  I  7  I  24  I  16 
1  and  2  see  p.  46. -48-
Table  24 
SUMMARY  OF  RESULTS  OF  "MOCK"  EUROPEAN  REFERENDUM 
I  B  DK  D  F  IRL  I  I  L  NL  UK  GR  I Ec
1 
1-




Average  percentage  of  "fors"l  I 
for  the  eight  ideas  mooted  I  55%  I  35  49  58  54  72  65  56  47  60 
Average  percentage  of  I 
"againsts"  27  I  48  34  28  31  16  27  34  44  24 
Difference  28  l-13.  15  30  23  56  38  22  3  36 
In  any  case national culture is not  the only variable  involved in producing 
the  small  number  of differences observed  above.  Replies  to  some  of the 
questions  are closely linked  to  the  cognitive mobilization2 of the  respondents; 
this  is true,  for  example,  in the  case of the  European  passport  and  the 
rejection of  a·ny  move  to  compartmentalize  the  Community  job market.  Others 
correlate more  strongly with political  ideology:  for  example,  the  idea of a 
European currency is more  attractive to  the  left than to  the right. 
All  the  statistics obtained  from  the  survey will  be  studied  in depth at  a 
later date.  For  the  time  being it is sufficient to  draw  the  following  three-
fold  conclusion: 
1 
2 
- there  is a  body  of European public  op1n1on  in the  sense  of areas of 
agreement  and  disagreement  common  to the majority of countries; 
- with  the  exception of Denmark,  this opinion  is generally pro rather 
than anti decisions  geared  to European unification; 
- the  level  of attachment  to  symbols  of national  sovereignty  - other  than 
currency - is still very high  in all the countries. 
Weighted  average. 
"Cognitive mobilization" means  the ability to.take an  interest  in rela-
tively complex,  distant or abstract  problems.  It is measured here  by 
combining  the  answers  to  two  questions,  one  dealing with  propensity to 







TENTATIVE  SUMMARY  OF  ATTITUDES  TOWARDS  EUROPE,  THE  EUROPEAN  PA~LIAMENT 
AND  THE  EUROPEAN  ELECTIONS 
A multidimensional analysis was  made  of all the  replies  to  the  questions 
asked  in this  survey  on attitudes  towards  European unification and  the 
Community,  the role of the European Parliament,  intentions  to vote and 
related  issues.  The  main conclusions can  be  summed  up  as  follows: 1 
(See Table  25) 
1.  About  one  third of  interviewees  (33%)  form  what  could  be described 
as  a  "hard  core"  of  "pro-Europeans": 
- they  are  broadly in favour  of European unification and  the  Connnunity 
(as well  as  the creation of a  political union); 
-the most  committed  -.because  they are  the most  clear-thinking and  the 
most  exacting  - do  not overestimate the  importance  of  the  present role 
played  by  the  European Parliament,  but  they are almost  unanimous  in 
their desire to  see it expanded; 
-most of  them will vote  in the  European  elections. 
The  most  committed  members  of this  "avant-~arde" tend  to be men  rather 
than women;  their level of education  is fairly high;  most of them  are opinion 
leaders. 
Citizens  of  this  type are to be  found  in all the member  countries;  at 
their most  committed  they are  to  be  found  in much  higher numbers  in Italy 
than  elsewhere. 
2.  At  the other extreme,  there is a  minority of about  15%  on average who 
are "to some  extent against"  or  "very much  against" European unification 
and  the Community.  They  consider Parliament's role  to be of little or  no 
significance  and  half of  them would  like to  see it reduced  even  further, 
The  less  committed  are likely to abstain but  the hard-1iriers will  most 
probably  go  and  vote. 
This  type  is particularly common  in the United Kingdom  and  Denmark. 
3.  Between  these  two  extremes  lies a  mass  with  characteristics that are 
not  always  clearcut,  in which  one  can distinguish: 
- an  element  accounting for  more  than  a  third of the overall  population 
(about  36%),  which,  albeit half-heartedly  for  rather than  against 
Europe  and  the Community,  is divided  concerning the role of the Euro-
pean  Parliament;  some  tend  to  feel  that its current role is not 
important,  but would  like' to see it increased,  whereas  others  feel  that 
it is  important  but  do  not  want  it to  increase any  further; 
1  In  technical  terms  this  is  a  typological analysis  designed  to reduce  the 
multiplicity of replies  given by  interviewees  into certain ~~  as 
similar  and  as  dissimilar  from  one  another  as  possible, 50-
a  group.of almost 20%  who  could be described  as  indifferent  since  the 
majority of them fail  to reply to most  of  the  questions  asked  on  Europe. 
In all countries where voting is not  compulsory the  thrust of the 
election campaign will have.to be directed at this massive  "block" of 
citizens  in an attempt  to  persuade  them  to vote.  All  things being equal, 
what  proportion of this potential electorate turns out  to vote will depend 
mainly on  the  answers  given to  questions  as  simple  as  these: 
- What  are  the  short-term and  long-term objectives  proposed  for  Europe? 
- What  can the  European  Parliament  do with  its present  powers? 
- What  powers  must  it claim for  the representatives  seeking our votes 
to  be  credible? 
Notes  to  accompany  Table  25  on  p ..  51: 
1  Type  classification 
the  ten countries. 
the  exact  structure 
based  on  the  non-weighted  total of  interviewees  in 
The  results  shown  here have  been weighted  to  reproduce 
of  the  population. 
2  This  estimate  is based  on  the hypotheses  set out  on  pp.  16  and  18;  the  raw 
scores  projected  from  the  survey have  been revised  accordingly to  take 
account  of the average  projected  turnout  of  64%.  Its only purpose  is to 
illustrate the considerable variation  in levels of participation according 
to  the attitude of the voters  (whatever  the basis  for calculation). ..  • 
Table  25 
THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  EUROPEANS  ON  THE  EVE  OF  THE  ELECTIONS  TO  PARLIAMENT! 
ATTITUDES  BY  TYPE 
European unification: 
- very much  or to  some  extent  for 
- to  some  extent  or ve·ry  much  against 
Don't  know 
Total 
European  Community: 
- favourable 
- unfavourable 
Don't  know 
Total 
Present  role of European Parliament: 
- very  important  or  important 
- not  very or not  at all important 
Don't  know 
Total 
Desired role  for  European Parliament: 
- more  important 
- the  same 
- less  important 
Don't  know 
Total 
PROJECTED  TURNOUT  FOR  THE  ELECTIONS  TO 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  BY  TYPE  2 
1  and  2,  see  p.  so. 
lin favour  of Euro- i  Half-hearted  j In-
lpean  unificati~n  I  support  !differ-
land  the  Commun1ty  I  lent 
I  (33.3%)  I  (35.6%)  I (16.5%) 
I  11  IIncreasedlsame  role! 
Ivery  I  ess  I  I  'tt d  "tt d  role  for  for  EP  lcomm1  e  lcomm1  e  IEP  1 
I  (16.6%)  I  (16.7%)  I  (21.1%)  I  (14.5%) 
I 
I  I 
.  98%  I  94%  I  78%  I  82%  I  40% 
I  2  I  13  I  1  I  5 
2  I  4  I  9  I  11  I  55 
100  I  100  I 
100  I 
100  I 
100 
I 
96%  I  89%  I  58%  I  63%  I  30% 
I  1  I  9  I  10  I  8 
4  I  10  I  33  I  27  I  62 
100  I 
100 
I 
100  I 
100  I 
100 
49%  I  73%  I  41%  I  63%  I  11% 
48  I  22  I  52  I  21  I  15 
3  I  5  I  7  I  16  I  74 
100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
92%  I  81%  I  80%  I  14%  I  6% 
6  I  13  I  11  I  42  I  11 
I  1  I  2  I  18  I  4 
2  I  5  I  7  I  26  I  79 
100  I  100  I  100  I  100  I  100 
I  I 
94%  I  68%  I  60%  I  33% 
I  I 
!Hostile  to  Euro-
1 pean unification 
1 and  the  Community 
1  (14.6%) 
I  I 
I less.  1 very.  1 
1 comm1ttedl comm1ttedl 
I  (12.5%)  I  (2.1%) 
I 
I  38%  I  4% 
I  5o  I  -95 
I  12  I  1 
I 
100  100  I 
I 
I  7%  2%  I 
I  53  84  I 




72%  I 
13  I 
15  I 
106-1 
I 
58%  I 
13  I 
29  I 
I 
100  100  I .  100  I 
I  18%  17%  I  43%  I 
I  70  76  I  38  I 
I  12  7  I  19  I 
I  100  100  I  100  I 
I  8%  I  15%  I  50% 
I  29  I  22  I  17 
I  41  I  47  I  10 
I  22  I  16  I  23 
I  100  I  100  I  100  I 
I  20%  I  80%  I  64% 
V1 Table  25  (contd.) 
THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF.EUROPEANS"ON  THE  EVE  OF"THE  ELECTIONS  TO  PARLIAMENT! 
lin  favour of Euro- I  Half-hearted  I  In- !Hostile  to Euro- I  TOTAL 
lpean unification  !  support  I  differ- lpean unification 
I  and  the  Connnunity  I  I  ent  I and  the  Connnunity 
I  I  I  I 
I  (33.3%)  I  (35.6%)  I (16.5%)  I  (14.6%) 
I  I  I  Increased I  Same  role  I  I  I  I 
Ivery_  lless.  lrole  for  lfor EP  I  lless.  Ivery.  I 
connn1.tted I connn1.tted I  EP  I  I  I connn1.ttedl connn1.ttedl 
!DISTRIBUTION  OF  TYPES  BY  COUNTRY  I  ( 16 • 6o/~_j  (16•7%)  I  \21.1%)  L (14•5%)  I  I  (12.5%)  I  (2.1%)  I  (100%) 
I 
I 
1  Belgium  I  12%  I  21%  I  26%  I  9%  I  19%  I  13%  I  I  100% 
:  Denmark  I  3  I  5  I  8  I  19  I  21  I  24  I  20  I  100  1  · I 
Germany  I  14  I  16  I  21  I  14  I  19  I  15  I  1  I  100  I  ~ 
France  I  19  I  18  I  25  I  14  I  18  I  5  I  1  I  100 
Ireland  I  9  I  19  I  19  I  17  I  23  I  11  I  2  I  100 
Italy  I  30  I  22  I  20  I  7  I  18  I  2  I  1  I  100 
Luxembourg  I  20  I  30  I  24  I  11  I  10  I  5  I  •  I  100 
Netherlands  I  20  I  19  I  23  ·  I  20  I  9  I  8  I  1  I  100 
:  United  Kingdom  I  6  I  9  I  16  I  24  I  12  I  29  I  4  I  100 
1 Greece  I  10  I  24  I  31  I  5  I  20  I  6  I  4  I  100 EURO-BAROMETRE  N°  21  EURO-BAROMETRE  Nr.  21 
ANNEXES  I  APPENDIX - A 1  -
INSTITUTS  CHARGES  DU  SONDAGE  ET  SPECIALISTES  RESPONSABLES  / 




Ell  as 
France 
Ireland 
I tali  a 
Luxembourg 
Nederland 
DIMARSO  N.V. 
rue des Colonies,  54 
B-1000  Bruxelles 
Tel.:  02/219.24.08 
GALLUP  MARKEDSANALYSE  A/S 
Gammel  Vartov  Vej  6 
DK-2900  Hellerup 
Tel.:  01/29.88.oo 
EMNID-INSTITUT  GmbH 
BodelschwinghstraBe,  23-25a 
D-4800  Bielefeld 1 
Tel.:  0521/210.58 
ICAP  HELLAS  S.A. 
Vas.  Sophias,  64 
GR-Athinai  615 
Tel.:  01/7225.651 
INSTITUT  DE  SONDAGES 
LAVIALLE 
6-8 rue  du  4  Septembre 
F-92130  Issy-les-Moulineaux 
Tel.:  554.64.11 
IRISH  MARKETING  SURVEYS  Ltd 
19-20 Upper  Pembroke  Street 
IRL-Dublin  2 
Tel.:  76.11.96 
ISTITUTO  PER  LE  RICERCHE  STA-
TISTICHE  E  L'ANALISI  DELL'O-
PINIONE  PUBBLICA  (DOXA) 
Galleria San  Carlo,  6 
I-20122  Milano 
Tel.:  02/790.871 
INSTITUT  LUXEMBOURGEOIS  DE  RE-
CHERCHES  SOCIALES  (ILRES) 
6,  rue  du  Marche-aux-Herbes 
GO-Luxembourg 
Tel.:  0352/475021 
NEDERLANDS  INSTITUUT  VOOR 
DE  PUBLIEKE  OPINIE  (NIPO)  B.V. 
Barentzplein,  _7 
NL-1013  NJ  Amsterdam 
Tel.:  020/24.88.44 
United Kingdom  (xx)  SOCIAL  SURVEYS  (GALLUP  POLL) 
202  Finchley Road 
UK-LONDON  NW3  6BL 
Tel.:  01/794.0461 
Leo  VEREYCKEN 
Nicole  GOOSSENS 
Rolf  RANDRUP 
Walter  TACKE 
Anthony  LYKIARDOPOULOS 
Tilemachos  DIB 
Albert LAVIALLE 
John  F.  MEAGHER 
Ennio  SALAMON 
Louis  MEVIS 
Arnold  WEIJTLANDT 
Norman  WEBB 
Robert  WYBROW - A  2  -
Coordination  internationale I 
International co-ordination 
Helene  RIFFAULT 
FAITS  et OPINIONS 
25,  rue  Cambon 
F-75001 Paris 
Tel.:  011296.41.65 
Toutes  les  donnees  relatives aux  Euro- .All  Euro-Barometre  data are stored 
Barometres  sont deposees  aux  "Belgian  at the Belgian  Archives  for  the So-
Archives  for  the  Social Sciences",  (1  cial Sciences  (1,  Place Montesquieu, 
Place  Montesquieu,  B-1348  Louvain-la- B-1348  Louvain-la-Neuve).  They  are 
Neuve).  Elles sont tenues ala dispo- at the disposal of all institutes 
sition des  organismes  membres  du  Euro- members  of the  European  Consortium 
pean  Consortium for Political Research  for Political Research  (Essex),  of 
(Essex),  du  Inter-University Consor- the  Inter-University Consortium  for 
tium  for Political and Social Research  Political and Social  Research  (Michi-
(Michigan)  et des  chercheurs  justi- gan)  and of all those  interested 
fiant d'un interet de  recherche.  in social science research. 
Pour  tous renseignements  sur les etu-
des  d'opinion publique faites  a  l'ini~ 
tiative de  la Commission  des  Communau-
tes europeennes,  ecrire a J.-R.  RABIER 
Conseiller special,  200  rue  de  la Loi, 
B-1049 Bruxelles. 
For all information regarding opi-
nion  surveys  carried out  for  the 
Commission of the  European  Communi-
ties,  please write to J.-R.  RABIER, 
special Counsellor,  200  rue  de  la 
Loi,  B-1049  Brussels. 
(x) ·  Les  dix instituts actuellement charges  de  ces sondages  ont  forme  entre 
eux  THE  EUROPEAN  O~NIBUS SURVEY,  dont le comite  de  direction comprend: 
Robert  GIJS  (DIMARSO,  Bruxelles),  Jan  STAPEL  (NIPO,  Amsterdam)  et Nor-
man  WEBB  (Social  Surveys,  London).  I  The  ten institutes which  car-
ried out these surveys have  formed  amongst  themselves  THE  EUROPEAN 
OMNIBUS  SURVEY  of which  the  Management  Committee  comprises:  Robert 
GIJS  (DIMARSO,  Brussels),  Jan  STAPEL  (NIPO,  Amsterdam)  and  Norman 
WEBB  (Social Surveys,  London). 
(XX)  Le  sondage  en  Northern  Ireland est fait en collaboration par le Irish 
Marketing Surveys et le Social Surveys  (Gallup Poll).  I  The  Northern 
Ireland Survey is conducted  jointly by  Irish Marketing Surveys  and 
the  Social  Surveys  (Gallup Poll). - A  3  -
ECHANTILLONNAGE  /  SAMPLING 
L'objectif de  la methode  d'echantillon-
nage est de  couvrir de  fagon  represen-
tative la totalite de  la population 
des  dix pays  de  la Communaute  agee  de 
15 ans  et plus. 
L'echantillon de  chaque  pays est cons-
titue a deux niveaux: 
1°  Regions et localites d'enquete 
The  sample has  been  designed to be 
representative of the total popula-
tion aged  15 years  and over of the 
ten countries of the  Community. 
In  each country a  two  stage sampling 
method  is used: 
1°  Geographical  distribution 
Les  statistiques de  la Communaute  euro- For statistical purposes  the  Euro-
peenne divisent l'espace europeen en  pean  Community  divides Europe  into 
117 regions  (voir liste ci-jointe).  117 regions  (see  attached list). 
L'enquete  a  lieu dans  115 regions  (Cor- The  survey  takes  place in 115 of 
se et Val  d'Aoste exceptes).  these regions  (Corsica and  Val  D'aos-
Chaque  pays  a  constitue aleatoirement 
un  echantillon-maitre  de  localites 
d'enquete  de  telle sorte  que  toutes 
les categories d'habitat soient repre-
sentees proportionnellement a leurs po-
pulations respectives. 
Au  total,  les interviews  de  l'enquete 
Omnibus  Europeenne ont lieu dans  en-
viron 1  150 points d'enquete. 
2°  Choix des  personnes  interrogees 
Les  personnes  interrogees sont toujours 
differentes d'une enquete a l'autre. 
L'echantillon-maitre aleatoire evoque 
ci-dessus  indique le nombre  de  person-
nes  a interroger a chaque  point d'en-
quete.  Au  stade suivant,  les personnes 
a interroger sont designees: 
- soit par  un  tirage au sort sur liste 
dans  les pays  ou on  peut avoir acces 
a des  listes exhaustives d'individus 
ou  de  foyers:  Belgique,  Pays-Bas, 
Danemark,  Luxembourg; 
- soit par echantillonnage stratifie 
sur la base  des statistiques de  re-
censement,  l'echantillon etant con-
struit a partir des criteres de  se-
xe,  age et profession:  France,  Ita-
lie,  Royaume~Uni,  Irlande,  Allemagne; 
- soit par une  methode  combinant les 
deux  precedentes  (cheminement syste-
matique):  Grece. 
te excluded). 
In  each country  a  random  selection 
of sampling points is made  in such 
a  way  that all types of area  (urban, 
rural,  etc.)  are represented in pro-
portion to their populations. 
The  interviews are distributed in 
more  or less 1  150  sampling points. 
2°  Choice  of respondents 
For  each survey different indivi-
duals are  interviewed in the  master 
sample of sampling point described 
above.  Within  these sampling points 
the  individuals to be  interviewed 
are chosen: 
- either at random  from  the popula-
tion or electoral lists in those 
countries  where  access  to suitable 
lists of individuals or households 
is possible:  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Netherlands,  Luxembourg; 
- or by  quota  sampling.  In these 
cases the  quotas  are established 
by  sex,  age  and occupation on  the 
basis of census  data:  this system 
is used in France,  Italy,  United-
Kingdom,  Ireland and  Germany; 
- or by  a  method  combining the  two 
precedent ones  ("random  route"): 
Greece. , 
- A  4  -
REGIONS  D'ENQUETES  /  GEOGRAPHICAL  DISTRIBUTION 
BELGIQUE/BELGIE 
AN  Antwerpen 
W.V.  West-Vlaanderen 
O.V.  Oost-Vlaanderen 
BR  Brabant 
LI  Limburg 
LIE  Liege 
HAI  Hainaut 
NA  Namur 
LX  Luxembourg 
BUNDESREPUBLIK  DEUTSCHLAND 
S.H.  Schleswig-Holstein 
STA  Stade 
AUR  Aurich 
OLD  Oldenburg 
B  Bremen 
LUN  LUneburg 
BR  Braunschweig 
OSN  OsnabrUck 
HAN  Hannover 
MUN  MUnster 
DET  Detmold 
HIL  Hildesheim 
DUS  DUsseldorf 
ARN  Arnsberg 
KAS  Kassel 
AA  Aachen 
KOL  Koln 
TRI  Trier 
KOB  Koblenz 
DA.WI.:  Darmstadt-Wiesbaden 
U.F.  Unterfranken 
O.F.  Oberfranken 
SAA  Saarland 
RH.PF.:  Rheinhessen-Pfalz 
N.B.  Nordbaden 
N.W.  NordwUrttemberg 
M.F.  Mittelfranken 
O.PF.  Oberpfalz 
N.BAY.:  Niederbayern 
S. B.  SUdbaden 
S.W.  SUdwUrttemberg 
SCH  Schwaben 
O.BAY.:  Oberbayern 

















Region  Parisienne 































LI  Limburg 


















































:  Mid  West 
South East 
South West 
IT  ALIA 
V.D.A.:(Valle  d'Aosta) 
PIE  Piemonte 
LOM  Lombardia 
T.AA  Trentino-Alto Adige 

















Kentriki  EllAs  kai 
Evia 
Pelop6nnissos 














Liguria  Thessalia 
Emilia-Romagna  Makedonia 
Toscana  ThrAki 
Umbria  Nissoi  Aigaiou 







CAL  Calabria 
SIC  Sicilia 
SAR  Sardegna 
LUXEMBOURG 
LX  :  G.D.  du  Luxembourg 
NEDERLAND 
GR  Groningen 
FR  Friesland 
DR  Drenthe - A  5  -
POPULATION  ETUDIEE,  TAILLE  DES  ECHANTILLONS,  DATES  DU  TRAVAIL  I 
SURVEYED  POPULATION,  SIZE  OF  THE  SAMPLE,  DATES  OF  FIELDWORK 
I  Population  ( 1)  Echantillons  I 
I  Samples  (2)  Dates 
lmilliers /I  %  (Baro  21)  (Baro  21) 
!thousands  I 
B  I  7  878  I  3.66  1.018  14-30/III/1984 
DK  I  4  070  I  1.89  997  24/III-1/IV 
D  I  50  656  I  23.55  992  17/III-9/IV 
GR  I  7  551  I  3.51  1  000  16-27/III 
F  I  41  904  I  19.48  1  008  17/III-9/IV 
IRL  I  2  408  I  1.12  1  002  21/III-6/IV 
I  I  44  739  I  20.80  1  060  19/III-5/IV 
L  I  298  I  0.14  300  22/III-13/IV 
NL  I  11  075  I  5.15  1  015  24-31/Ili 
UK  I  44  489  I  20.69  1  356  19/III-5/IV 
CE/EC  I  215  068  100.00  9  748  14/III-13/IV/1984 
RECOMMANDATION  AU  LECTEUR  I  ADVICE  TO  READERS 
Il est rappele  que  les resultats obte-
nus  par sondage  sont des  estimations 
dont  le degre  de  certitude et de  pre-
cision depend,  toutes choses egales 
d'ailleurs,  du  nombre  des  individus 
constituant l'echantillon.  Avec  des 
echantil1ons  de  l'ordre de  1  000,  on 
admet  generalement qu'une  difference 
inferieure a cinq pour cent entre  deux 
pourcentages .est au-dessous  du  niveau 
acceptable  de  confiance. 
Readers  are  reminded  that  sample 
survey  results  are  estimations,  the 
degree . of  certainty  and  precision  of 
which,  everything  being  kept  equal, 
rests  upon  the  number  of cases.  With 
samples of about  1  000,  it is general-
ly  admitted  that  a  percentage  diffe-
rence  of  less  than  five  per  cent  is 
below  the  acceptable  level  of  confi-
dence. 
(1)  15 ans  et plus  I  15 years  and  over. 
(2)  Nombre  d'interviews  I  Number  of interviews. 
.. 